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Abstract 
The theme of this study is the Arab Spring and democratisation. The Arab Spring 
affected every country in the region very differently. This study aims to explain 
the variation of the state of democratisation in the different countries, as well as 
identify the factor(s) behind this variation. Six countries are selected for the 
analysis; half of them experienced major changes, the other half just minor 
political changes. These are tested against the modernisation theory, while 
controlling for Huntington's theory about waves of democratisation. The chosen 
method is a comparative politics method, together with quantitative analysis. The 
result shows that, contrary to the modernisation theory and the hypothesis, 
economic and socioeconomic development does not explain the variation in the 
state of democratisation. Countries with minor political changes are, to some 
extent, also more developed. The result further suggests that other factors such as 
economic failure and monarchy’s resilience could possibly explain the variation in 
the state of democratisation.  
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1 Introduction 
On 17 December 2010, the street vendor Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi, set 
himself on fire in the city of Sidi Bouzid, in Tunisia. This was done in an act of 
desperation and as a protest against the local police and municipal officials that 
had confiscated his wares and mistreated him.  
This became the catalyst - and marked the beginning - of the Arab Spring. It 
began with protests in Tunisia, but it soon spread across the whole Arab world1, 
leaving virtually no country in the region unaffected. It caused a major turmoil 
and change, but to a very different degree depending on the country. In some 
countries there were major protests and unrest, sometimes leading to the 
government being overthrown, for instance as in Tunisia and Egypt, while the 
protests escalated to civil war in other countries like Libya and Syria. There were, 
however, several countries where the political unrest did not lead to any major 
changes, where the Arab Spring left the authoritarian regimes moderately 
unaffected. This illustrates a puzzling and interesting variation among countries in 
the region – countries that are in many ways similar - but where the Arab Spring 
had a very different degree of effect. How could this be explained, and which 
factors caused this variation of the state of democratisation? The Arab Spring is a 
contemporary phenomenon and there is still much uncertainty concerning which 
way the Arab countries will go and if the recent development will lead to a full 
democratisation. However, this study will take a closer look at the initial phase of 
the Arab Spring, and try to explain the variation in the state of democratisation.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 When referring to the region where the Arab Spring occurred it is easy to get caught up in a debate over 
geographical definitions. Some would refer to the region as the Middle East, which is a very broad term, 
including countries from Morocco to Afghanistan, and even Turkey and Cyprus (CEE 2013a). Others would 
name the region MENA, for Middle East and North Africa, which is almost as broad. This study has instead 
chosen to use the term Arab world, or Arab states, which is used by both the World Bank and UNESCO. See 
http://data.worldbank.org/region/ARB http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/worldwide/arab-states/ 
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2  The research problem 
The Arab Spring is a remarkable case of how civil protests and demands for 
political reforms could spread from one country to a whole region of countries in 
a matter of weeks. The Arab Spring as a phenomenon is highly relevant and 
topical as a case of democratisation within the field of Political Science. It offers a 
wide range of different cases or countries where to study this democratic 
transition. Considering that virtually all countries in the region were classified as 
authoritarian prior to the Arab Spring, there is a clear focus on the change or 
transition towards democracy. There is, however, another side to it, this is not a 
past phenomenon. The Arab Spring is quite present and ongoing. The political 
changes and reforms are continuously being implemented and it is too early to see 
where this will lead. This does make it more complex to analyse as it is a moving 
and changing study-object. On the other hand it offers an opportunity to study a 
recent phenomenon, where there is still much research do be done.   
The Arab Spring is here studied as a case of democratisation or democratic 
transition. More precisely this study will focus on the political state of 
democratisation in the countries in the region. While most countries in the region 
were affected by the Arab Spring, the state of their democratisation varies a lot. 
This will be analysed with the help of modernisation theory, while controlling for 
Huntington’s theory about waves of democratisation. The preliminary hypothesis 
is that modernisation, in terms of economic and socioeconomic development, 
helps to explain the variation in the state of democratisation.  
 
The research-question would be formulated as follows: 
- How can the recent political state of democratisation, in the wake of the Arab 
Spring, be explained? 
 
Sub-question: 
- Which factor(s) could help to explain the variation of democratisation in the 
region? 
 
While some countries have experienced a major political change after the Arab 
Spring, other countries only have a low degree of change, thus the state of 
democratisation varies a lot between the countries in the region. The aim of this 
study is to explain this variation. The dependent variable is therefore measuring 
the state of democratisation, after the initial part of the Arab Spring, separating 
between major and minor political change. In relation to the sub-question, this 
study aims to identify the factor(s) behind the variation of democratisation during 
the Arab Spring. 
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2.1 Delimitation: Democratisation and democracy 
The main theme of this study is democratisation and thus, by extension, 
democracy. This section will discuss and define these two concepts, which will 
guide the delimitation of the study. However, this will only offer a brief 
introduction, and by no means a complete overview of the different 
democratisation and democracy theories.  
 
The definition of democratisation is described as how one form of exercise of 
power is replaced by another. The previous form is regarded as non-democratic 
and is replaced by a more democratic one, and democratisation as a concept 
catches and refers to this transition. Democratisation could be described both as a 
change with a direction, or as a process structured into phases (Denk & Silander 
2007:10-12).  Democratisation as a direction refers both to a complete, as well as 
to an incomplete, transition from a non-democratic state to a democracy (Denk & 
Silander 2007:17f). In the case of the Arab Spring the outcome of the 
democratisation is still unknown and volatile. Hence this study will focus on the 
change or movement towards democracy, rather than only focus on a complete 
transition. Democratisation could also be described as a process consisting of four 
phases, offering a broader analysis than merely the direction or change from non-
democratic towards democracy. Dankwart Rustow was the first one to introduce 
this idea, he named the four phases: background condition, preparatory phase, 
decision phase, and habituation phase (Rustow 1970; 1999:25-35; Sørensen 
1998:40-46). However several other scholars have since followed and formulated 
their own models of these phases. A summary of these models could be found in 
Denk and Silander’s book (2007:26-34) (my translations, Rustow’s model in 
brackets): 
- Entity phase (Background condition) – The society is established and 
stabilised as a political entity.  
- Dissolution phase (Preparatory phase) – The non-democratic way to 
govern the society is dissolved. 
- Transition phase (Decision phase) – Efforts to establish a democratic way 
to govern the society commence. 
- Consolidation phase (Habituation phase) – The democratic way to govern 
the society stabilises. 
 
Considering this model, and applying it to the case of the Arab Spring, there is a 
strong variation among the different affected countries. Which phase are the Arab 
countries in? Some states have experienced just a minor step towards 
democratisation, putting them somewhere between the entity (background 
condition) and dissolution (preparatory) phase. Other countries with major 
changes are more in the transition (decision) phase. The two folded answer to this 
question is precisely what constitutes the puzzle, or the research problem, for this 
study. It is also important to note that the full transition towards consolidated 
democracy may take a long time, sometimes several decades (Sørensen 1998:41).  
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There is a myriad of definitions of democracy. Ranging from the most basic 
Greek origin, with demos (people) and kratos (rule), “rule by the people” 
(Sørensen 1998:3), to one of the most prominent and well-cited definitions made 
by Robert A. Dahl (Denk & Silander 2007:18f). According to Dahl, the 
democratic system is made up of these eight institutions (Dahl 1989:220-222): 
1. Elected officials. 
2. Free and fair elections. 
3. Inclusive suffrage. 
4. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 
5. Right to run for office. 
6. Freedom of expression. 
7. Alternative information. 
8. Associational autonomy. 
 
In a non-democratic society these institutions are not present according to this 
theory. Furthermore Dahl concluded that there is no state in the world where these 
eight conditions are fully satisfied (Sørensen 1998:12). Yet, this merely offers an 
illustrative description of democracy. This study will, however, rather than 
stipulate a theoretical framework of democracy on its own, rely on already 
established operationalized definitions. For instance Freedom House’s 
comparative index of democracy in the world, offers a definition of democracy in 
line with Dahl’s own. It is also one of the few democracy indexes that are 
annually updated, which offers a more updated comparison of level of democracy 
(Denk & Silander 2007:89-105; Sørensen 1998:16-20; Freedom House). This 
index will enable a comparison of the different countries in the Arab world. 
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3 Theory 
The overall theme for the selected theories in this study is “democratisation”. 
Democratisation, as well as democracy theory, are perhaps the most central areas 
within political science, with a wide range of theories to choose from. Hence a 
theoretical delimitation is needed in order to tighten the theoretical discussion and 
focus. As previously mentioned, democratisation is a process that occurs in 
different phases (see previous section 2.1). This study does not intend to cover the 
complete transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. Instead, focus 
lies on the initial phases of the democratisation. In other words, the start or the 
triggering factor in an authoritarian state that eventually, and assumedly, lead to 
democratisation. More precisely, the scope of this study is delimited to the 
Dissolution phase (Preparatory phase) and the Transition phase (Decision phase). 
However, in this phases it is impossible to predict exactly in what way the 
political situation will develop. History has shown that a revolution or political 
liberalisation does not necessarily point toward a road to democratisation. This 
study recognises this issue, but instead makes the theoretical assumption that the 
recent democratisation in wake of the Arab Spring is to be regarded as the 
Dissolution phase (Preparatory phase) of a democratisation. Whether these 
countries become full-fledged democracies in the end, the process stagnates, or 
even reverses, is not of decisive importance for the study, rather, it is the initial 
aim and stated purpose of the revolution that defines it as a case of 
democratisation.  
3.1 Selecting theories 
Within the toolbox of democratisation theories two main types of theories have 
been selected in order to explain the recent state of democratisation. The first one 
is modernisation theory, which takes into account the states’ internal features and 
characteristics (i.e. economic growth and socioeconomic development). Following 
the recent events during the Arab Spring, it has been suggested that modernisation 
had a strong effect (Kuhn 2012; Campante & Chor 2012). There are also previous 
case studies from the region that point in the same direction. In the case of Jordan, 
Mohamed Abdullah Abu Rumman finds that the economic situation in the country 
had a strong impact on the democratisation from 1989 and the preceding years 
(Rumman 2012). More support for the relationship between economic factors and 
democratisation is found in Brynen (1992) or in Rumman (2010) which links a 
socioeconomic factor as education with democratisation. This forms good support 
for the choice of theory. There is, however, a lack of more recent studies of the 
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region, and it will be interesting to see how these theories apply to the latest 
development during the Arab Spring.  
The second theory discusses the external factors that are presumed to trigger a 
democratisation of a state. This theory assumes that a state’s democratisation 
could be explained by more external and global factors, rather than just its internal 
characteristics. Samuel P. Huntington’s idea about waves of democratisation is 
here the most prominent theory. It gives a more global perspective of 
democratisation and how events in one state is neither separated nor unaffected 
from the rest of the world. The Arab Spring serves as an example of how events in 
one country triggered reactions in other countries within the region. This is the 
reason why this theory was selected for the study, with the hope to explain how 
external factors contributed to current development in the region. Furthermore, in 
a recent case-study of Syria and Egypt after the Arab Spring (Sarihan 2012), Ali 
Sarihan concludes that at least the latter seems to have experienced all the phases 
of Huntington’s third wave of democracy (Sarihan 2012:80-82). 
The separation between internal and external theories is a common division in 
the literature, but often formulated in different ways. Lauri Karvonen makes the 
distinction between “modernisation” and “international factors” (Karvonen 1997), 
and the terms “national factors” and “international factors” is found in Denk and 
Silander’s book (2007). Other authors chose to deem both theories as 
“preconditions” for democratisation, albeit with a distinction between 
socioeconomic development and modernisation on one side, and “international 
factors” and “waves of democracy” on the other (cf. Hadenius 2006; Ekman et al. 
2006). For the sake of simplicity, this study will henceforth discuss these two 
theories as internal and external factors, with the latter including Huntington’s 
theory about waves of democratisation.  
It is not claimed that neither of these two theories are independent from each 
other nor mutually exclusive. They should rather be seen as complements to each 
other, by explaining both the internal and external factors of democratisation. It 
would be imprudent to think that a state is only affected by internal factors thus 
being autonomous from external influence. On the other hand, external factors 
would have a very small effect if the internal prerequisites for democratisation did 
not exist. These two theories are therefore in many aspects intertwined (cf. 
Karvonen 1997:108f; Ekman et al. 2006:199-202). 
This study will apply the modernisation theory on the case of the Arab 
Spring, and test its explanatory power. The external theory, with Huntington’s 
waves of democratisation, will be used as an explanatory theoretical complement, 
and will be controlled for. Important here is to again accentuate that the study 
tests the modernisation theory, while controlling for the external factors. 
Assuming that internal and external factors are in many ways intertwined, putting 
these two theories against each other would be both unnecessarily time-
consuming and also somewhat counter-productive. Therefore it would not be 
fruitful to take on a research approach wherein both theories are tested against 
each other.   
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This study recognises the existence of several other theories that could explain the 
variation in the state of democratisation. Huntington lists several plausible factors 
that are said to contribute to democratisation (Huntington 1991:37; see also 
Welzel 2009). Among these are for instance theories looking at agrarian regimes 
and industrialisation in a study by Barrington Jr. Moore (Moore 1967), or various 
studies on how religion seems to have an impact on the level of democracy (e.g. 
Stepan 2000; cf. Welzel 2009:80). Furthermore, a classic study by Alexis de 
Tocqueville, named Democracy in America, written in two volumes 1835 and 
1840, discusses how a vibrant civil society is beneficial for a democracy (see 
Tocqueville 1840). There is also a somewhat similar but later study by Robert 
Putnam (Putnam 1993). Some theories bring in social classes and their connection 
to democratisation (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Even geopolitical factors are said 
to play a role in democratisation, some of which include the size of the state or 
how island states tend to be more democratic (cf. Anckar 2002a; 2002b; 2004; 
2010). 
However, after carefully examining the wide range of other democratisation 
theories and previous research on the subject (see chapter 4), this study has come 
to the conclusion that the two selected theories are the most fitting to be applied to 
the case of the Arab Spring, as well as the most prominent theories within this 
field. Several of these other factors are also accounted for and sometimes included 
in the modernisation theory and in Huntington’s theory. This makes them broader 
and more applicable to the case of the Arab Spring.  
3.2 Internal factors – Modernisation theory 
The most central scholar within modernisation theory ought to be Seymour Martin 
Lipset, who formulated his theory in an article from 1959 (Karvonen 1997:28f). In 
the chapter titled “Economic development and Democracy” he states:  
“Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to 
other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of 
economic development. Concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. (Lipset 
1959:75; Lipset 1960:48-50)” 
This laid the foundation for what came to be known as the modernisation 
theory, linking economic development and democratisation together. Numerous 
scholars have since then revisited Lipset’s ideas and made their own contribution 
to this theory. Nevertheless the core essence of the modernisation theory remains 
today. The concept of the theory is that economic development eventually leads to 
a democratisation of the country. Adam Przeworski argues that democracy always 
survives in a country which is sufficiently developed, while democracy rarely 
survives in poor countries (2005:265f). This does in addition add a more 
democracy consolidating effect to economic growth.  
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Economic growth in a country is usually correlated with a higher level of 
Education. With a stronger economy the government has more money to invest in 
education, which is always a necessary feature in a developed economy. 
Education is said to broaden the citizens’ outlook, help them understand the 
norms of tolerance, restrain them from adhering to extremist and monistic 
doctrines, and help them make more rational choices. This summarises many of 
the features needed for a democratic political culture (Lipset 1959:79; Karvonen 
1997:29; Hadenius 1992:78).  
When the people’s economic situation improves, there is a change in the time 
perspective that they put in politics and society. With more wealth and education 
people are less likely to adhere to quick extremist ideas. In other words, there is a 
shift from lower class values and needs, to a more middle class set of values, with 
a better understanding of political processes and their implementation. A broader 
middle class provides a safer economic situation and inspires a more sensible 
approach to politics, hence leading to a weakening of political extremism in the 
country (Lipset 1959:83; Karvonen 1997:29f). An essential and recurrent part in 
this theory is how the society shifts from a large lower class to a stronger middle 
class. The theory is, in its simplicity, formulated like this, “economic growth 
produces an educated and entrepreneurial middle class that, sooner or later, 
begins to demand control over its own fate. Eventually, even repressive 
governments are forced to give in” (Downs & de Mesquita 2005:77). 
Furthermore, since the wealthier middle class now has more time, they engage 
themselves in various organisations. The civil society – as an important part of a 
democracy – is therefore strengthened (Karvonen 1997:30). 
Larry Diamond, one of Lipset’s employees, published an article in 1992 which 
further strengthened the support for Lipset’s theory. Diamond’s findings also 
contributed to a more detailed analysis and broadened perspective. The causal 
relationship between economic development and democratisation was not linear 
according to Diamond. Every increase in economic development did not 
automatically increase the likelihood of democratisation. Instead the curve was 
more N-shaped, meaning that in the beginning modernisation increased the 
chances of democratisation, but on a middle level the effects of economic growth 
were gone or even negative. It was first when the country was among the most 
developed that the causal relationship was once again positive. Diamond further 
concludes that it is not only economic growth that is needed for democratisation, 
but also socioeconomic progress (Diamond 1992:125-128; Karvonen 1997:33f; 
See also Boix 2011). Axel Hadenius (1992) is another scholar that contributed to 
the field of modernisation theory, albeit with a different approach than Lipset and 
Diamond. Hadenius instead analysed all the countries in the developing world, 
thus moving away from analysing only the wealthy countries in Europe which his 
predecessors had focused more on. In his study he broke down the concept of 
socioeconomic development into several factors or variables, for instance, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita, literacy rate, urbanisation, infant mortality 
rate, and education. A summary of Hadenius’ findings is that socioeconomic 
development is positively correlated with democracy, but that it consists of two 
dimensions: economic development, plus cultural and educational resources. The 
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latter dimension has the strongest explanatory power on democratisation, with 
literacy rate being the best single explanatory factor. Beside these findings, infant 
mortality rate is found to have a significant negative relationship with democracy, 
a high infant mortality rate tends to lower the level of democracy in a country 
(Karvonen 1997:35-37). Hadenius’ work is relevant for this study, as it is focusing 
on developing countries and his detailed operationalization of socioeconomic 
development offers a good base for additional analysis which will be further 
elaborated in the method-chapter.  
3.2.1 Critics, exceptions and empirical tests 
If we test this theory empirically it becomes evident that there are several 
exceptions from this “rule”. Economic growth does not necessarily lead to 
democratisation in every country, as we can see today. The most noteworthy 
exceptions today ought to be Russia, China, and the oil-rich gulf-states, with 
Brunei belonging to that group as well (Karvonen 1997:42f; Downs & de 
Mesquita 2005:78). The latter group has become a research topic in itself, since 
oil- or mineral-rich countries often score low in democracy. There has been 
studies testing the casual relationship between these, for instance Michael L. Ross 
analyses this link in his article “Does oil hinder democracy?” (Ross 2001). His 
conclusion is that oil does indeed hinder democracy in many cases, also deeming 
this issue as a “resource curse effect” (Ross 2001:356f). Further research found 
less support for Ross’ resource curse hypothesis when the theory was tested under 
a longer time period (Oskarsson & Ottosen 2010:1079f). Nonetheless, other 
results found that oil, gas and to some extent hard minerals seemed to generate 
“bad wealth” for a country, hence inhibiting the democratisation process (Nilsson 
2008:30). The income the oil generates is also what preserves and protects these 
authoritarian regimes, implicitly making their rule dependent on the world’s oil 
demand and the global oil price (Hadenius 2006:225). One explanation could be 
that these resources mostly benefit the wealthy elite and hence do not contribute 
to expanding the middle class. Without a shift towards a stronger middle class 
there will not be a significant social change in the country, and the 
democratisation will not occur. According to Huntington, the oil revenue accrues 
to the state, thus increasing the power of the state and reducing the need for the 
government to collect taxes. With a low level of taxation the public has hence less 
reason to demand representation (Huntington 1991:65). Following the recent 
events in the Arab world, Ross draws the attention to the fact that the Arab Spring 
has only seriously threatened one oil-funded rule so far, (i.e. Muammar al-Qaddafi 
in Libya), further confirming that oil wealth is still one of the most stubborn 
obstacles to democratic reform (Ross 2011). This does of course depend on how 
you define “seriously threatened”, as there are other oil-rich countries that have 
experienced major protests during the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, al-Qaddafi is the 
only one who have been overthrown.  
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As demonstrated above, Lipset’s modernisation theory has a limited explanatory 
power today and one should take caution when applying it globally (Downs & de 
Mesquita 2007:77-80; Hadenius 2005:36-40; Robinson 2006). Consequently, 
Lipset’s theory has been criticised by numerous scholars. Criticism has for 
instance been that Lipset only used cross section data, while still trying to find a 
historical relationship. He was also criticised for putting too much focus on 
Christian western countries, thus excluding many developing countries in his 
analysis (Karvonen 1997:32). Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker mean that 
modernisation theorists are partly right. The shift towards an industrialised society 
does indeed lead to cultural changes in a country, where the norms change from 
traditional values and absolute norms to increasingly rational, tolerant and trusting 
values. Yet, modernisation does not follow a linear path, different cultural zones 
tend to choose different ways, and some value systems persist in these cultures 
even after industrialisation (Inglehart & Baker 2000:49). Some also argue that 
while development theorists, such as Lipset, are right in assuming that increases in 
per capita income lead to increases in the populations’ demand for political 
change, they have clearly underestimated the ability of authoritarian regimes to 
thwart those demands (Downs & de Mesquita 2005:78). Robinson further 
weakens the theory by claiming that income per capita is only correlated with 
democracy because they are both influenced by the same underlying factors. This 
does not, however, imply that there is a causal relationship between income and 
democracy (Robinson 2006:517). He further concludes that, “More likely, these 
two variables are correlated because the same factors that tend to make a society 
prosperous also tend to make it democratic” (Robinson 2006:525). Another study 
suggests that democracy is often associated with, for instance, higher human 
capital accumulation, lower inflation and higher economic freedom. In this study, 
they study the suggested reversed causal relationship that democracy would lead 
to economic growth. While they do not find any evidence that democracy would 
be detrimental to growth, they do however find that democracy has a strong 
indirect effect on economic growth (Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu 2008:1-5 & 
35f). This further shows that economic growth and democracy are in many ways 
intertwined and often occur together. Some scholars might question the 
detrimental causal relationship between economic growth and democratisation 
laid out by Lipset, nonetheless it is still clear that these factors are related. It is 
furthermore still one of the most prominent and influential theories within 
democratisation today. An interesting read here is the text written by Larry 
Diamond (1992), in which he revisited Lipset’s theory, decades after it was first 
formulated. Diamond reassessed the theory and found that it still had strong 
support in most cases.  
In regards to this study, the modernisation theory has some constraints when 
it comes to the troublesome interpretation of the oil and gas producing countries. 
Many of the countries in the Arab world belong to this group, making it hard to 
include them in the analysis. As a result, it will be important to take this into 
account when selecting cases to analyse. 
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3.3 External factors – Waves of democratisation 
In his book “The third wave – Democratisation in the late twentieth century”, 
Samuel P. Huntington (1991) formulated his theory about how democratisation 
has occurred in, so far, three successive waves in the world (Karvonen 
1997:108f). The first “long” wave of democracy started with the American and 
French revolutions and occurred during 1828-1926, followed by a shorter second 
wave in the end of World War II, from 1943 to 1962. Similar to the characteristics 
of a wave, there were also reverse waves in the gaps between the waves of 
democratisation. The democratisation process tapered off, and many states that 
had previously adopted a democratic form experienced a reversal back to more 
authoritarian rule (Huntington 1991a:16-21). Huntington described the 
democratisation contra reverse waves as a two-step-forward, one-step-backward 
pattern. This meant that the reverse waves eliminated some of the transitions 
towards democracy, but not all. More and more states have become democratic 
over the decades, albeit with some reversing (Huntington 1991a:25). The third 
wave started, according to Huntington, in Lisbon, Portugal, in 1974. The 25 April 
coup d’etat in Portugal, that ended the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano, marked 
the beginning of the third wave (Huntington 1991b:3-21). It remains unclear if we 
are still experiencing Huntington’s third wave of democratisation today. Some 
would suggest the recent events during the Arab Spring are so unprecedented that 
it could be a sign of even a fourth wave of democratisation. However, following 
the logical pattern of Huntington’s theory we ought to have first experienced a 
third reverse wave, before a fourth wave could occur. This study has not found 
any research or evidence suggesting that such a reverse wave has occurred in the 
world - in a larger scale – since 1974 (cf. Diamond 1996; 2005; 2011:305). This 
study works with the assumption that the third wave of democratisation is still 
ongoing2. Ali Sarihan makes the same assumption when he applies Huntington’s 
theory on the cases of Egypt and Syria in his recent study of the Arab Spring 
(Sarihan 2012). Furthermore, there is another reason for making this assumption. 
There is already a well-established definition and theoretical definition of the third 
wave that is suitable to apply in the case of the Arab Spring. Discussing whether 
the Arab Spring is a fourth wave of democratisation or not would require a more 
theory-developing project and falls far from the purpose of this study.  
According to Huntington, five major factors have contributed to the third 
wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991b:13):  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 There are some scholars that argue that we have already passed the third wave and what we see now is the 
fourth wave of democratisation (cf. Kuzio 2008; McFaul 2002; Olimat 2011; Popescu 2012; Way 2005). 
However these articles are fairly inconclusive and use the term "fourth wave" more in a descriptive way, and 
often lack a theoretical definition of this new wave. This study relies on Huntington's original theory, and has so 
far not found any clear evidence suggesting the need to discuss contemporary events in terms of a fourth wave of 
democratisation. 
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1. A deepening legitimacy problem for authoritarian regimes in a world 
where democratic values are becoming widely accepted, and these 
regimes’ inability to maintain successful performance or “performance 
legitimacy” due to economic or military failure.  
2. The unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised 
living standards, increased education, and expanded the urban middle class 
in many countries. (This is strongly related to the modernisation theory, 
pointing to an external global economic growth that affects internal 
factors.) 
3. The shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church and the 
transformation of national Catholic churches from defenders of the status 
quo to opponents of authoritarianism.  
4. Changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European 
community, the United States, and the Soviet Union.  
5. “Snowballing”, meaning the demonstration effect or transitions earlier in 
the third wave which stimulated and provided models for subsequent 
efforts at democratisation.  
 
These five factors constitute the theoretical base of Huntington’s third wave of 
democratisation, and will later be tested for in the analysis. However, parts of the 
factors are a bit outdated, for instance the significance of the Soviet Union as an 
important external actor, and the third factor might not apply to the case of the 
Arab Spring. Some alteration of the factors might be needed in order to optimise 
the theory.  
3.3.1 Critics, exceptions and empirical tests 
 
Seth G. Jones (2013) goes against the notion that the Arab Spring should be seen 
as a delayed third wave, or even a fourth wave, of democratisation. He argues that 
this is merely a mirage, and that there are low prospects for further 
democratisation in the wake of the Arab Spring. He does for instance show that 
the countries in the region still have low scores in Freedom House’s ratings (Jones 
2013). However, one could also argue that it is still too early to make this claim, 
and that the democratisation-process takes longer than the two years Jones 
analysed. Historically we can see that revolutions did not have an immediate 
success in creating a democracy, but did instead forever erode the legitimacy of 
the dictatorial regime that they challenged (Stepan & Linz 2013:28f).  
In an article by Mark Thompson (1993) he argues that Huntington’s idea 
about a “snowballing effect” is empirically supported in many parts of the world. 
However, there seems to be an exception when it comes to some Southeast Asian 
countries. Compared to other regions in the world, the democratisation in 
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ASEAN3 has been limited. Thompson analyses how the authoritarian polity in 
ASEAN countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia4 have remained 
immune to democratisation. While authoritarian regimes in many other countries 
have faced declining legitimacy problems, these countries have still enjoyed a 
high degree of popular public support (Thompson 1993:469f). Legitimacy 
problem is, as previously stated, something that Huntington takes into account and 
one of the major factors that have contributed to the third wave of 
democratisation. Thompson argues that these three countries have legitimised 
their non-democratic rule by for instance an outstanding economic growth, while 
at the same time succeeded in limiting income inequality. Furthermore they have 
claimed that their political systems are based on a different kind of ‘democracy’, 
thus not comparable to a western model (Thompson 1993:471). Acemoglu & 
Robinson conclude that the reason why Singapore has not democratised is 
because it is a very equal society, with no traditional wealthy elite, therefore, most 
people appear to be relatively happy with their situation (2006:353f). As such, the 
Singaporean government is not facing a legitimacy problem and its people have 
little to gain relatively from a democratisation, compared to what they already 
have. Though the Arab world is indeed very different from Southeast Asia, it is 
possible that they share some similarities. There is a rather paradoxical 
relationship between economic growth and democratisation, where many 
authoritarian regimes are dependent on this to legitimise their existence. 
Economic growth could over short term increase an authoritarian regime’s 
prospects of survival. However, it eventually leads to democratisation in the long 
term as it creates the resources needed for the change towards democracy and thus 
threatens the survival of a repressive government (Karvonen 1997:33; Downs & 
de Mesquita 2007:79). This is a vivid example of how economic growth, in line 
with Lipset’s theory, works together with Huntington’s factor of “global 
economic growth”. Although, this should be seen in relation to the authoritarian 
regime’s ability to legitimise its rule, as failure would eventually lead to a 
democratisation in that country. It does, as well, show how some countries have 
been able to withstand Huntington’s snowball effect.    
As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter there are some parts of 
this theory that would be regarded as a bit outdated, such as the importance of the 
Catholic Church or discussing external actors like the Soviet Union. Keeping this 
in mind, some parts of the theory could be disregarded when studying the recent 
case of the Arab Spring. While it is believed that other parts of the theory can 
contribute greatly to explain the case of democratisation in the wake of the Arab 
Spring.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
4 Bearing in mind that Thompson’s article was written in 1993, there have been some changes since then. 
Indonesia can to some extent be said to have gone through a democratisation process today, if you consider their 
democracy score from Freedom House, where they are ranked ‘Free’ (2012).  
- http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia 
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3.4 Hypothesis 
Based on the two previously described theories, modernisation theory and 
Huntington’s waves of democracy, this section will try to formulate a short 
hypothesis for this study. This hypothesis will be tested against the empirical 
material in the analysis. 
 
Hypothesis: 
Economic development, including socioeconomic development, is believed to 
explain the state of democratisation in that country. Hence, a country with a 
relatively strong development within these two areas is believed to have a higher 
degree of democratisation, compared to those countries with a low level of 
development. This also suggests that a country that has reached a certain degree of 
economic maturation will experience democratisation. This describes the internal 
factors in that country, but these are dependent on that the external prerequisites 
apply. For democratisation to take place there is a need for the major factors 
defining Huntington’s third wave of democratisation, to be in place.  
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4 Literature-review 
The literature-review should be seen in relation to the selected theories for this 
study. It is believed that it will also help guide the selection of cases and the 
operationalization, as well as contribute to broaden the analysis for this study. 
This chapter consists of several articles about the Arab Spring that are collected 
and examined. While it would be nearly impossible to cover everything that has 
been written about the topic, the purpose of this chapter is to offer an overview of 
previous research within this field. Much of the previous research has dealt with 
explaining the cause of the Arab Spring as opposed to the reason for why there is 
variation between the countries. However, many of the articles touch upon the 
research-question for this study, and are often intertwined. There are four main 
themes identified in the literature-review, namely, 1) monarchy’s resilience, 2) the 
role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Saudi Arabia, 3) economic factors and 
modernisation, and 4) social media.  
 
Monarchy’s resilience  
Many scholars have focused on the Arab monarchies and how these have proven 
to be very resilient in the face of political challenges. In an article by Lisa 
Anderson (1991), she notes that the major ruling monarchies in the world reside in 
the Arab world, where they rule more than a third of the countries of the Arab 
league (Anderson 1991:1). This still remains true today. The Arab monarchies of 
Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar 
and Bahrain (although major clashes occurred here) have all remained reasonably 
unaffected in the wake of the Arab Spring (Kühnhardt 2012:58; Tétreault 
2011:629; Jones 2013). There are many different explanations to the resilience of 
the Arab monarchies. Anderson put forward arguments as regional exceptionalism 
and cultural determinism, monarchy is a traditional and by that a congenial type of 
regime in the Islamic world. Historically the Arab monarchies were an instrument 
of European imperial policy, and especially British. Important to note here is that 
almost all the states in the region, monarchies as well as republics, are a product 
of the twentieth century. Hereditary monarchy in the Arab world is not a 
traditional regime type with deeper historical roots (Anderson 1991:2, 11). 
Nevertheless, Elliot Abrams (2012) claims the opposite, that it is actually the 
historical connection of the Arab monarchies that give them their strength and 
legitimacy. He explains how the monarchy is often sustained by religious belief, 
and this gives them more legitimacy than any self-appointed strongmen (Abrams 
2012:27). According to Anderson many republican regimes in the region mimic 
the monarchies in the sense that they are so called “presidential monarchies”, 
regimes in which a strongman dominates a state with relatively few stable 
political institutions (Anderson 1991:11). This might be exemplified by a famous 
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quote from the former Tunisian president Bourguiba. When asked by a journalist 
in the 1960s about Tunisia’s political system, he exclaimed, in a perhaps Louis 
XIV inspired quote5, “The system? What system? I am the system!” (Moore 
1965:51). It is possible that a similar position expressed by Bourguiba might as 
well been seen among many Arab leaders, at least before the Arab Spring. 
 
The role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Saudi Arabia 
Other scholars focus on the resilience of the gulf monarchies. While one could 
argue that their resilience is due to oil and wealth, Tétreault means that another 
common denominator for these countries are the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). Countries like, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), are all members of this organisation. Tétreault 
argues that the aegis of the GCC have helped these countries against the political 
challenges during the Arab Spring. One example here is how Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE sent troops to Bahrain to help their security forces quell the protests in 2011 
(Tétreault 2011:629-632; Kühnhardt 2012:58; Jones 2013). Ludger Kühnhardt 
follows the same line of thoughts, but focuses more on the role of Saudi Arabia as 
the protector of monarchies. He argues that Saudi Arabia, as the main power in 
GCC, is particularly interested in supporting the Arab monarchies. This would 
also explain the motive behind inviting Morocco and Jordan to join the GCC, 
which were understood as a means to curb and curtail reforms that could 
challenge the existing structure of power in these countries (Kühnhardt 2012:58, 
66; Helfont 2012:84; Salih 2013:202). Some would claim that Jordan has, in the 
wake of the Arab Spring, become a battleground between those who would like to 
see a more democratic country and those who would like to maintain economic 
stability. Saudi Arabia together with the rest of the GCC are in the forefront of the 
actors who wish to preserve the economic stability in the region, and thwart any 
democratic reforms that might threaten this stability (Helfont & Helfont 2012). In 
the article, “Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring”, Toby Craig Jones (2011) 
examines how the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been able to evade public unrest 
and revolutions during the Arab Spring by seeking the support of the religious 
establishment (Jones 2011; Salih 2013:199), as well as offer a package of 
economic reforms by, for instance, allocating money to aid the unemployed (Salih 
2013:198f; Ben-Meir 2012:110). The article also corroborates previous articles 
that claim that Saudi Arabia with its regional hegemony and fear for regional 
democratisation, has tried to counter the revolutions in neighbouring countries 
(Jones 2011). The Saudi Arabian dynasty of Al Saud fear that democratic change 
will threaten their power, but also the privilege and excess that comes with it 
(Jones 2011:44f). In line with this, Lisa Anderson describes another aspect of the 
monarchy, “[…] no king wants himself or his successor to be the end of the 
dynasty. This is no doubt a very powerful motive for the monarch himself,” 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Referring to the famous, presumably apocryphal quote, made by the French king Louis XIV, while addressing 
the Parliament of Paris (13 April, 1655).  "L'Etat, c'est moi." - "I am the State." or "The state, that is me" 
(Dulaure 1834:298). 
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(1991:15). Some scholars argue that while the coup-proofing strategies that Saudi 
Arabia has adopted have proven to be successful for now, this strategy cannot 
respond to political challenges in the long-term, and therefore reforms will be 
needed (Mabon 2012:550; Ben-Meir 2012:111). 
 
Economic factors and modernisation 
The economic factors behind the Arab Spring have been one of the main 
explanations used by media, but also by many scholars. One noteworthy example 
of how these factors could explain the Arab Spring is The Economist’s “Shoe-
thrower’s index”, which measures the Arab countries’ vulnerability to revolution. 
This index is made up by putting together and weighing a number of indicators 
that they believe feed unrest in the Arab world, such as youth population, years of 
government in power, corruption, GDP per capita, and several other indicators. 
The result shows that the potential for unrest in the Arab world 2010 were highest 
in Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Syria, while countries like Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and 
Lebanon had the lowest scores (the Economist 2011:26). The index lacks 
theoretical backing, but is to some extent empirically supported. However, other 
scholars support some of these indicators. The economic impoverishment of the 
majority of the people, staggering food prices, high rates of unemployment, and 
especially among the large youth population - are all regarded as plausible roots 
and causes for the Arab Spring (Salih 2013:187). Especially the deteriorating food 
security and living standards in the region is said to have led to the uprisings 
(Breisinger et al. 2011). Another article focuses on the youth population and 
discusses the Arab Spring in terms of a “youth revolution”. The high 
unemployment among the young people in this region is seen as a major problem, 
with youth unemployment as high as 80 % in some areas. The overall conclusion 
is that frustration with the lack of jobs makes the youth population more prone to 
protest (Hoffman & Jamal 2012:169f, 184f). Emmanuel Martin claims that one of 
the more forgotten causes for the Arab Spring was the lack of economic freedom 
in these countries. The government policies required tremendous administrative 
steps to set up a formal business, which Martin sees as a part of the political 
oppression and authoritarianism in these countries (Martin 2012:94f). 
In line with the chosen theory for this study, there is also literature that brings 
up the modernisation theory as a possible explanation for the Arab Spring. 
Randall Kuhn (2012) uses the modernisation theory when analysing the Arab 
Spring. He claims that no other developing region has seen such improvements in 
the human development, with for instance declining child mortality, increased 
schooling and longevity. This human development fosters a set of higher 
expectations among the citizens on the government, including the right to self-
determination. In his conclusion he suggests that this might eventually lead to a 
democratic change (Kuhn 2012:674-677). Filipe R. Campante and David Chor 
(2012) break down the modernisation theory and decide to focus on education as 
an underlying mechanism. They discuss the interaction between schooling 
background and economic circumstances, and especially the scarcity of job 
opportunities for university graduates. They further describe how the pace of 
growth, i.e. modernisation, does not keep up with the education profile of its 
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population (Campante & Chor 2012). They do not make a clear conclusion of 
their result, but the result displays how factors as youth population, 
unemployment, economic growth, and education, are all intertwined. In the case 
of Morocco, Badimon makes a similar connection between the high 
unemployment among university graduates and the social unrest during the Arab 
Spring. However, many of the university graduates were reluctant in joining any 
political alliance against the government, as there was a risk that this would 
jeopardise their chances of getting hired in the public administration (Badimon 
2013).  
 
Social media 
In recent research about the Arab Spring it has been much in fashion to discuss 
the role of social media, making it almost mandatory to address this topic in some 
way6. In some articles this is termed as a “Twitter -” or “Facebook revolution” 
(Khan 2012:56), but also “cyberactivism” (Khondker 2011:678), and “social 
media revolution” (Comunello & Anzera 2012:453). However, social media could 
both be seen as an effective tool for the rebels, but also for the repressive machine 
(Comunello & Anzera 2012:465; Khan 2012:56).  Many scholars agree that social 
media played a significant role, but was nonetheless not the main cause of the 
Arab Spring or the determinant factor (Comunello & Anzera 2012:453; Wolfsfeld 
et al. 2013; Joffé 2011:525). Social media was an “accelerator” of the Arab Spring 
(Khan 2012:62), or a vital tool, but the most important underlying factor was the 
presence of revolutionary conditions (Khondker 2011:678). 
 
Other articles 
Some authors analyse the role of the armies in the Arab uprisings, and thus how 
the armed forces acted differently in the Arab countries. For instance it is 
suggested that some of the variation between the outcomes of the different 
countries during the Arab Spring, could be explained by the role of the armies. 
This is for instance exemplified by the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, where the 
army in one way facilitated the overthrowing of the governments, while there was 
stronger military resistance against the protesters in countries like Libya and Syria 
(Frisch 2013; Salih 2013). Ellen Lust (2011) does instead look at the relationship 
between Islam and democratisation. She means that it is not the religion itself that 
stalled the “third wave of democratisation” during the Arab Spring, but it was 
instead the fear of political Islam. This fear was used by the regime to drive a 
wedge between Islamic and secularist opposition groups, in order to weaken their 
efforts to struggle against the regime (Lust 2011:186-188).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Social media is mentioned and discussed in several articles (cf. Ben-Meir 2012:106f; Comunello & Anzera 
2012; Joffé 2011:525; Khan 2012; Khondker 2011; Kuhn 2012:650; Mabon 2012:531f, 542-544; Tétreault 
2011:630f; Price 2008:306-310; Wolfsfeld 2013; Worrall 2012:99) 
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5 Method 
In regards to the stipulated theories and the multi-facetted case of the Arab Spring, 
there is a wide range of aspects to analyse. The Arab Spring is analysed on a 
macro-level and the study objects, or cases, are consequently set to different 
countries. These countries will be compared to each other in order to explain the 
state of democratisation, and to identify the factor(s) that could help explain their 
variation. When choosing the method for a comparison, it often comes down to 
the choice between an intensive case analysis with a small amount of cases (small 
N), or a statistical analysis (large N). Arend Lijphart does for instance discuss 
both comparative and statistical methods in his article. He argues that the 
comparative method resembles the statistical in all respects, except concerning the 
number of cases analysed. The small number of cases does not permit systematic 
control of partial correlations between the variables, i.e. a statistical method 
(Lijphart 1971:684f). The Arab Spring offers a limited amount of comparable 
cases, therefore, it would not be appropriate to choose a purely statistical method 
for this study. Instead, because of the limited amount of cases, the chosen method 
for the study is a comparative method. However, it does not necessarily have to be 
a choice between comparative and statistical methods. Many scholars argue for 
the advantages of mixed methods, by combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods (cf. Coppedge 1999; Lieberman 2005; Lijphart 1971). Another reason is 
that the different factors defined in the stipulated theories could be measured and 
operationalized both as quantitative variables, and as qualitative factors. This is 
one of the reasons for conducting the study with a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. For this study a mix of both methods has been chosen. It is 
done with the aim that these methods will complement each other, as some parts 
might be more suitable to measure quantitatively, while other parts would benefit 
from a more qualitative approach. 
 
For the first part of the analysis, the chosen method is set to a comparative politics 
method known as the most similar systems design. The design of the method is 
created as a comparison between very similar cases, which only differs in the 
dependent variable. Simplified it means that difference is explained by difference 
(Denk 2002:57f; Denk 2007:120-124). This is done with the assumption that it 
would make it easier to identify the independent variable which explains the 
outcome in the dependent variable. Ideally only one, or a few, independent 
variables will differ between the countries, and will consequently be regarded as 
the determining factor(s). This comparative strategy has its origin in John Stuart 
Mill’s “indirect method of difference”, described in his book “A System of Logic” 
from 1843 (Esaiasson et al. 2012:117-120; Denk 2002:56-58; George & Bennett 
2005:152-160). The choice of method is inspired by Theda Skocpol’s famous 
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study of social revolutions, in which she compared the revolutions in France, 
Russia and China, while using England, Germany and Japan as contrast-cases 
(Skocpol 1979:155-157 & 40ff; George & Bennett 2005:158f). Skocpol’s study of 
revolutions is relevant in regard to the Arab Spring, especially through a 
methodological perspective. This study is also inspired by and shares many 
similarities with Lipset’s classic study (Lipset 1959), and should therefore work 
well with the modernisation theory.  
This method will be further complemented with a statistic method. The chosen 
cases are divided into two groups, conditional on the dependent variable. These 
two groups will be compared, in order to measure if the difference between them 
are statistically significant (Körner & Wahlgren 2005:136-144; Esaiasson et al. 
2012:389f). This method is a good complement to the comparison, as it will 
further strengthen the validity of the result.  
5.1 Dependent variable  
The issue here is the definition of the dependent variable. In line with the 
research-question the aim of the study is to explain the state of democratisation, 
and identify which factor(s) that explain the variation between the countries. The 
dependent variable would then be whether a country was affected by the protests 
and went into a state of democratisation or not. However, virtually every state in 
the region was affected during the Arab Spring, and is in some state of 
democratisation. There have been different degrees of democratisation in the 
countries, varying from minor governmental concessions in order to placate the 
people, to stronger reactions where the government has been overthrown. This 
method does however require similar countries, but with a different outcome on 
the dependent variable. The dependent variable is hence more dichotomous, in the 
sense that it puts the cases, or countries, in two different groups by separating 
between minor and major political changes. Apart from that, the case-selection 
strives to include otherwise similar cases, in accordance with the chosen method. 
The definition of a ‘major’, respectively ‘minor’ political change, is complex, as 
previously discussed these countries have experienced very different degrees of 
political changes.  
Therefore the definition of the dependent variable relies on a theoretical 
definition. The country's state of democratisation after the Arab Spring is 
described as a political change. This definition is based on democratisation theory 
(see chapter 2.1), and is derived from Dankward Rustows’ four phases of 
democratisation (Rustow 1970; cf. Denk & Silander 2007:26-34). Each case is 
presented and described more detailed in chapter 7.  
 
Minor political changes 
These countries are still in the Entity phase (Background condition) according to 
Rustow's definition. The regime is still in power and they have not moved towards 
the Dissolution phase (Preparatory phase). Yet, while minor political and 
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economic reforms have been made in the country, the regime is still in possession 
of their core power.  
 
Major political changes 
These are the countries that have gone through the Dissolution phase (Preparatory 
phase), where the non-democratic way to govern the society has been dissolved. 
They have then further moved into the Transition phase (Decision phase) where 
efforts to establish a democratic way to govern the society have commenced. In 
practise this means that the regime in the country has been dissolved, and replaced 
by another. This is regarded as a drastic change that assumedly open up for more 
significant changes in a country compared to minor government concessions. 
5.2 Selection of cases 
There are some general criteria for the case selection. Firstly, the countries are 
geographically located in the Arab world, the region where the Arab Spring 
occurred. These countries share many similarities when it comes to culture, 
language, and religion, thus suitable for a comparison in line with the most similar 
systems design.  
Secondly, the Arab Spring is still to some extent ongoing or in a stage of 
aftermath. It is therefore important to define a clear time limit. The selected 
countries are those that have been affected by the Arab Spring since its start in 
December 2010 until January 2013.  
Thirdly, the scope of the analysis is limited to countries that prior to the Arab 
Spring were not fully democratic, thus excluding those countries in the region that 
were already democracies. In terms of measuring degree of democracy, this study 
relies on Freedom House’s ranking of, ‘free’, ‘partly free’, and ‘not free’ 
(Puddington 2011:22f), where a status of ‘partly free’7 and ‘not free’8 is regarded 
as not being fully democratic.  
Fourthly, the selected countries must of course also be selected, and divided, 
on the basis of the previously stated definition of the dependent variable. 
 
For theoretical reasons countries that rely heavily on oil and gas have been 
excluded from the comparison. These countries often represent an exception from 
the modernisation theory and thus it complicates comparison with the other 
countries. Syria has furthermore been excluded from the comparison as the civil 
war is still ongoing and its volatile status makes it an uncertain case for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 ’Partly free’ countries in the region according to Freedom House’s ranking 2010: Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
and Yemen. – (Puddington 2011:22f) 
8 ’Not free’ countries in the region according to Freedom House’s ranking 2010: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. – 
(Puddington 2011:22f) 
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moment. Based on the four criteria, one comparison model is created, containing 
two groups of similar countries. The following countries have been selected for 
this study (more detailed information in chapter 7): 
 
Comparison model 
 Countries that have only experienced minor political changes: Jordan, 
Lebanon and Morocco.  
 Countries that have experienced major political changes: Egypt, Tunisia 
and Yemen.  
 
5.3 Operationalization 
In this section the terms and concepts from the theory-chapter will be 
operationalized into more measureable variables or indicators. Operationalization 
means that the theory is translated in a way that makes it possible to identify the 
terms in reality. Within positivism there are two basic requirements for 
operationalization, high validity and high reliability. Put in other words, that the 
operationalization actually catches what the theory intends to examine, and that it 
is possible to measure it with precision (Lundquist 1993:99f). For this study many 
of the theoretical terms need to be operationalized into quantified variables. The 
operationalization is hence strongly connected to the chapter regarding material, 
but does also seek support from the literature-review, and the theory-chapter.  
Instead of making its own operationalization, this study relies on the work 
done by Axel Hadenius. In his book, Democracy and development, he analyses 
the countries in the developing world through modernisation theory (Hadenius 
1992). The characteristic of Hadenius’ work is his strong focus on socioeconomic 
development. Further support for the use of many of these operationalizations is 
also found in Lipset’s original work (Lipset 1960). These variables are often 
categorised into different groups, whereas both Hadenius and Lipset have a 
different way of sorting these indicators. Sorting the variables into different 
groups does not have a particular methodological purpose per se, yet it is here 
used to make it easier for the reader to follow the lines of thoughts behind these 
operationalizations. Lipset has four categories of indicators in his comparison, 
namely: a) indices of wealth, b) indices of industrialization, c) indices of 
education, and d) indices of urbanisation (Lipset 1960:48ff; Lipset 1959:76-78). 
Hadenius used similar variables but categorised them slightly different. He 
measured economic development in terms of: Gross National Product (GNP), 
energy consumption per capita, employees in different sectors (agriculture, 
industry and service), and the countries’ industrial production in relation to GNP. 
Actual standard of living is measured as: consumption of calories and infant 
mortality in the population. Media exposure and mass communications is 
measured as: the distribution through the population of daily newspapers, 
telephones, radio and TV sets. Moreover he uses indicators as: Urbanisation, 
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literacy, school attendance at the different stages of the school system (primary, 
secondary and higher) (Hadenius 1992:83; 87; 101f). Larry Diamond used similar 
indicators as both Lipset and Hadenius (cf. Diamond et al. 1990:11-14; 1992).  
For this study, these variables have been merged together into three groups of 
indicators. This operationalization intends to cover the theoretical concept of the 
modernisation theory, including terms such as, economic growth, education, the 
shift towards a stronger middle class, and the changing time perspective. There 
are also some additional variables added in order to complement, as well as 
modernise the operationalizations, for instance a variable measuring the amount 
of internet and cell phone users, quite relevant today, but none-existent when 
Lipset and Hadenius made their study. Furthermore, UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) is used as a complement for measuring socioeconomic 
development (QOG Codebook 2011:219; HDI 2010), and a Gini-index as a 
measurement of income inequality is used in order to measure the class structure. 
As mentioned before, the operationalization is interconnected with the data-
collection, and as such it is dependent as well as constrained by the availability of 
data. This study has strived to select the most relevant variables, nonetheless, in 
those cases when data or relevant variables are missing, these have been excluded 
or replaced with the next best alternative.  
 
A short summary of the variables (more elaborated description could be found in 
appendix A): 
 
Economic development 
These variables are used to measure how economically developed a country is. It 
is believed that a higher electric power consumption and urbanisation reflects a 
more developed country. Urbanisation has always been linked with 
industrialisation, and thus regarded as an indicator for a country’s level of 
modernisation. Although it has less strength today, as it had during the twentieth 
century (Hall 2006:7-10; Knox & Marston 2007:403f). Agriculture, industry and 
service’s value added, are supposed to measure the economic transition from an 
agricultural-based economy to an economy based on the service sector. The 
growth of the service sector is connected to the rising per capita incomes in a 
country, with a larger increase in demand for services. This is associated with the 
changing time perspective as well, consumers start valuing their time and try to 
minimise the time inputs needed to accomplish many ordinary tasks (Bryson et al. 
2004:11f).   
 
- Gross National Income (GNI) per capita  
- Electric power consumption (kWh) per capita 
- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
- Industry, value added (% of GDP) 
- Service, value added (% of GDP) 
- Distribution of family income – Gini index 
- Urban population (% of total) 
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Socioeconomic development 
The HDI index is here one of the most important indicators, as it covers many of 
the other variables in this group. It is a composite measure of life expectancy, 
schooling, and gross national income per capita.  
 
- UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) value 
- Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)  
- Life expectancy at birth (Years) 
- Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) 
- School enrollment, primary (% gross) 
- School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 
- School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 
- Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) 
 
Media exposure and mass communications 
This group of variables is derived from previous research done by Diamond, 
Hadenius, and Lipset. The literature-review of more contemporary research done 
on the Arab Spring does in several cases emphasise the role of media and 
communication during the Arab Spring. It has often been seen as an accelerator or 
triggering factor, but not as the main cause, of the Arab Spring. Much of the focus 
has lied on social media, unfortunately this study has not been able to find any 
reliable data on the use of, for instance, Facebook, Twitter or Youtube. Instead, 
these four variables are believed to reflect how developed the media were in each 
country, as well as access to means of communications.  
 
- Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
- Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 
- Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People) 
- Internet users (per 100 people)  
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6 Material 
The material used for the analysis consists mostly of statistical data, i.e. quantified 
variables. This chapter is strongly connected to the chapter about 
operationalizations. Yet, while the operationalizations strive for a strong validity, 
this chapter focuses on this study’s reliability. It is here important to avoid 
measurement and unsystematic errors (Esaiasson et al. 2012:63; Lundquist 
1993:99f).  
One of the main criteria for the selection of data is that the data should come 
from a reliable and well-known source. The main source used for this analysis is 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank), it has been complemented - 
when needed - with data from the CIA World Factbook, as well as the Quality of 
Government (QOG) database. The QOG database is administered by the 
University of Gothenburg, and they have collected several different variables 
from other databases into one (Teorell et al. 2011). The selected variables are 
chosen based on their year of measurement. It is here important that the variables 
are measured prior to the Arab Spring, i.e. the year 2010, in order to measure their 
effect on the state of democratisation. In those cases when data is missing for the 
year 2010, most recent available data for the previous years (i.e. before 2010) 
have been used. Because of the variation in the different countries’ population, 
this has been taken into consideration by using percentage, or variables measured 
in per capita. For a thorough and detailed description of the material, including 
the variables used for the analysis, see appendix A.  
When measuring the level of democracy this study relies on the Freedom 
House index, as described in section 2.1. It can be problematic to base the 
measurement of such an important key factor on one source alone. However, this 
index is one of the most well-known ways to compare and measure democracy in 
different countries. It is also the index used in almost all previous literature on this 
topic. For these reasons, together with the importance of being consistent 
throughout this study, the Freedom House index is chosen for this study.   
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7 The Arab Spring: An introduction 
This chapter offers a brief introduction and overview of the Arab Spring, and the 
six selected countries for this study. It starts off with an introduction of the Arab 
Spring, with a general regional introduction, and then continues with each 
individual country. This introduction only covers the period of time from the 
beginning of the Arab Spring in December 2010, through the subsequent year of 
2011. 
 
The Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring, or the Arab uprisings, represents a revolutionary wave of 
demonstrations and protests that swept through the Arab world. It started off with 
protests in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-
immolation in protest of ill-treatment and police corruption (Salih 2013:184). This 
triggered protests in Tunisia, and in January 2011 the Tunisian president Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown (Mabon 2012:531). The waves of protests did 
not stop there, soon the protests spread into the neighbouring Algeria, and broke 
out in Egypt and Jordan in January 2011. By February 11 violent clashes forced 
Hosni Mubarak to step down and end his 30-years of power in Egypt (Helfont & 
Helfont 2011:83). Waves of protests continued to develop throughout the Arab 
world. Protests emerged in Bahrain, Morocco, Yemen, Jordan, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, and Lebanon, as well as Kuwait, Palestine, Iran and Iraq. The Arab Spring 
left hardly any country unaffected. Civil war broke out in Libya and Syria, where 
Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi was removed from power, whereas in the case of 
Syria the civil war is still ongoing (Jones 2013:1; Dupont & Passy 2011:447; 
Blight et al. 2012). Many of the demonstrations during the Arab Spring were also 
met with a violent response from the authorities, as well as from pro-government 
militias and counter-demonstrators (Salih 2013:184). 
 
Minor political changes 
Almost at the same time as in Egypt, protests broke out in Jordan on January 21, 
2011 (UCDP 2011). The protesters were demanding cuts in food and fuel prices, 
electoral reforms, and more power granted to the parliament. There were, as well, 
complaints about rampant poverty, high unemployment, and corruption in the 
country. King Abdullah II, in response, replaced his prime minister, and formed 
two commissions to study possible electoral reforms and constitutional 
amendments. He did as well offer a $125 million package of subsidies for fuel, 
sugar, and other products. There have been occasional violent demonstrations in 
Jordan, but so far the government’s concessions have managed to keep off most 
instability, leaving king Abdullah II still in power (BBC 2012; Jones 2013; 
Helfont & Helfont 2011; Miller 2011:34). 
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Lebanon faced a different sort of demonstrations amid the Arab Spring. 
While the key slogan in Egypt and Tunisia had been "The people wants to topple 
the regime", the protest movement in Lebanon adopted a slightly different slogan, 
"The people wants to topple the sectarian regime". On 27 February 2011, the anti-
sectarian movement, as it was referred to, held its first demonstration. The 
protests were not as much directed against the president, the prime minister or the 
government, but it was believed that the symbols of powers were located outside 
the official state institutions (Hermez 2011). However, the movement failed to 
attract a significant numbers of participants, and in spite of repeated calls, few 
people showed up for the demonstrations (Khashan 2011).  
Morocco saw its first protest on February 20, 2011, and demonstrations soon 
spread and sprung up in over 50 cities (Badimon 2013:207; Miller 2011:36). On 
March 9, 2011, King Mohammed VI held an extraordinary televised speech to the 
Moroccan people, in which he promised "a new charter between the throne and 
the people" and outlined a so called “package of comprehensive constitutional 
amendments”. The new constitution was to guarantee rule of law and an enhanced 
role for the prime minister, in practise it would reduce the king’s power and 
increase that of the elected government. On June 17, 2011, the new constitution 
was released and in a referendum two weeks later it was passed (Traub 2012:43; 
Maddy-Weitzman 2012). Whether the concessions done by the Mohammed VI 
were sincere and will ultimately lead to a political system in line with a 
constitutional monarchy, is yet to be seen. It is still safe to say that Morocco did 
not face the same turmoil and uprisings as other countries during the Arab Spring.  
 
Major political changes 
In January 2011, protests broke out in Egypt. After eighteen days of protests in 
Cairo and in other cities, President Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down on 
February 11, 2011. This ended Mubarak’s 30 years of power in Egypt. According 
to the Egyptian government fact-finding panel, 846 people were killed and more 
than 6,400 were injured during the uprisings. (BBC 2012; Salih 2013:193).  
As mentioned in the introduction, the protests in Tunisia began on December 
18, 2010. This was sparked by the self-immolation of the vegetable seller 
Mohamed Bouazizi in the city of Sidi Bouzid. This was done as a political protest. 
Pro-democratic and anti-regime protests rose up across Tunisia, in what came to 
be known as the “Jasmine Revolution”. In the violent clashes around 300 people 
died during the unrest. President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was toppled, after 23 
years in power, on the January 14 2011 (BBC 2012; Schraeder & Redissi 2011).  
In Yemen demonstrations started on January 27, 2011, calling for the end of 
president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 33-year rule. The president announced at a very 
early stage that he would not seek re-election and that he would not pass over 
power to his son. However this did not stop the protests, which became more 
frequent and widespread. It was also met with a deadly crackdown by the security 
forces and supporters of the president. In April 2011, Saleh refused to sign a 
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GCC9-brokered deal to hand over power in return for immunity from prosecution. 
This prompted the head of the Hashid tribal federation, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, to 
declare his support for the opposition. Heavy clashes between security forces and 
armed tribesmen occurred in the capital Sanaa, leaving dozens of people dead. In 
June, president Saleh was seriously injured by a bomb explosion and was forced 
to leave the country to seek medical treatment. He returned to Yemen in 
September amid a new wave of violence. In October 2011, the UN Security 
Council urged the president to agree to the GCC-brokered deal. President Saleh 
signed the deal November 23, and formally ceded power two days later (BBC 
2012; Salih 2013:193-195).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council 
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8 Analysis 
This chapter consists of three parts. It begins with the analysis of the internal 
factors, in which the modernisation theory is tested on the Arab Spring. The 
second part is the external factors, here represented by Huntington’s theory about 
waves of democratisation. Important to note is that this theory will only be 
controlled for, and not tested. The third and last part of this analysis offers some 
alternative explanations, while taking into account the result from the previous 
two parts. That part will take a closer look at the three countries that only 
experienced minor political changes, i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco.  
8.1 The internal factors 
In line with the research question for this study, the modernisation theory will 
hereby be applied to, and tested on, the Arab Spring. The result from the compiled 
database is here presented in three different tables, reflecting the three different 
groups of variables used in the analysis: i) Economic development, ii) 
Socioeconomic development, and iii) Media exposure and mass communications. 
The selected countries are, as mentioned before, divided into two groups, those 
with minor political changes and those with major changes. These two groups will 
be compared. According to the chosen method, most similar systems design, the 
objective is to identify differences that one group share in one or several of the 
variables, which is not apparent in the other group. A table for comparing the 
variable’s mean values for each group is also included. For further information 
about the analysis of mean values see Appendix B. 
This analysis is done in two parts. The first part analyse all six countries and 
compare the mean values between the two groups. It is an overall analysis, trying 
to find a pattern among the independent variables. The second part of the analysis 
takes a closer look at four of the countries, in order to further distinguish a pattern. 
Each variable is also compared to the world median value with the purpose of 
putting them more in a global context.  
8.1.1 First part 
This part is divided into three different sections, one for each group of variables 
analysed, together with one table that shows the comparison of mean values. 
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Economic development 
 
Economic development 
Country 
Gross National 
Income Per 
Capita (PPP 
2008 $) 
Electric 
Power 
Consumption 
(kWh) Per 
Capita 
Agriculture, 
value added (% 
of GDP) 
Industry, 
value 
added (% 
of GDP) 
Services, 
etc., value 
added (% 
of GDP) 
Distribution of 
Family 
Income, Gini 
Index 
Urban 
population 
(% of total) 
Jordan 5 956,00 2 225,57 3,00 31,00 66,00 39,70 82,00 
Lebanon 13 475,00 5 903,35 6,00 23,00 71,00 - 87,00 
Morocco 4 628,00 472,22 15,00 30,00 55,00 40,90 57,00 
Egypt 5 889,00 1 607,93 14,00 38,00 48,00 34,40 43,00 
Tunisia 7 979,00 1 349,97 8,00 31,00 61,00 40,00 66,00 
Yemen 2 387,00 248,62 8,00 29,00 63,00 37,70 32,00 
 
This comparison does not show any clear difference between the two groups of 
countries, i.e. those with major and minor change. The result from the statistical 
analysis, does not show any statistical significant difference, when the mean value of 
each group is compared. It seems as both groups are somehow similar, and no clear 
patterns are found here. Yemen is in almost every aspect the least developed country, 
with a low GNI per Capita and electric power consumption, as well as low degree of 
urbanisation. Lebanon, on the other hand, has a relatively strong GNI per Capita, 
combined with the highest electric power consumption, the largest share of service 
sector, as well as the largest urbanisation.  
 
 
Economic development - Comparing mean values 
State of 
Democratisation 
Gross 
National 
Income Per 
Capita (PPP 
2008 $) 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
(kWh) Per 
Capita 
Agriculture, 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
Industry, 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
Services, etc., 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
Distribution 
of Family 
Income, Gini 
Index 
Urban 
population (% 
of total) 
Minor Change 8 019,67 2 867,05 8 28 64 40,3 75,33 
Major Change 5 418,33 1 068,84 10 32,67 57,33 37,37 47 
 
Although not statistical significant, this table shows a comparison of the mean values 
for the different variables for each group. The result shows that, contrary to the 
stipulated hypothesis the group with the minor change are more economic developed 
than the group that experienced a major change. GNI per capita, electric power 
consumption, service sector, Gini-index, and urbanisation is larger in this group.  
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Socioeconomic development 
 
Socioeconomic development 
Country 
UNDP 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Mortality 
rate, 
infant (per 
1,000 live 
births) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(Years) 
Literacy 
rate, adult 
total (% 
of people 
ages 15 
and 
above) 
School 
enrolment, 
primary (% 
gross) 
School 
enrolment, 
secondary 
(% gross) 
School 
enrolment, 
tertiary (% 
gross) 
Public 
spending 
on 
education, 
total (% of 
GDP) 
Jordan ,6810 18,00 73,10 93,00 92,00 87,00 38,00 4,90 
Lebanon - 9,00 72,40 87,40 105,00 81,00 54,00 1,70 
Morocco ,5670 29,00 71,80 56,00 111,00 64,00 13,00 5,40 
Egypt ,6200 19,00 70,50 72,00 106,00 72,00 32,00 3,80 
Tunisia ,6830 15,00 74,30 78,00 110,00 90,00 36,00 6,20 
Yemen ,4390 58,00 63,90 64,00 87,00 44,00 10,00 5,20 
 
Similar to the comparison of economic development, it is not possible to find a 
clear pattern when it comes to socioeconomic development neither. The statistical 
analysis is not able to find a statistical significant difference between the two 
groups neither. Once again Yemen is here shown to be the least developed 
country. Yemen has the highest infant mortality rate, lowest life expectancy, the 
lowest school enrolment, as well as a low value on UNDP’s Human Development 
Index.   
 
Socioeconomic development - Comparing mean values 
State of 
Democratisation 
UNDP 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Mortality 
rate, 
infant 
(per 
1,000 
live 
births) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(Years) 
Literacy 
rate, 
adult 
total (% 
of 
people 
ages 15 
and 
above) 
School 
enrolment, 
primary 
(% gross) 
School 
enrolment, 
secondary 
(% gross) 
School 
enrolment, 
tertiary (% 
gross) 
Public 
spending 
on 
education, 
total (% 
of GDP) 
Minor Change ,624 18,667 72,433 78,800 102,667 77,333 35,000 4,000 
Major Change ,581 30,667 69,567 71,333 101,000 68,667 26,000 5,067 
 
The difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. However, by 
examining the mean values for each variable, it is suggested that the group with 
minor change is more socioeconomic developed than the other group. This result 
is apparent for each indicator except for the public spending on education.  
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Media exposure and mass communications 
 
Media exposure and mass communications 
Country 
Telephone 
lines (per 
100 
people) 
Mobile 
cellular 
subscriptions 
(per 100 
people) 
Daily 
Newspapers 
(per 1,000 
People) 
Internet 
users 
(per 100 
people) 
Jordan 8,00 107,00 74,23 27,20 
Lebanon 21,00 68,00 55,57 43,70 
Morocco 12,00 100,00 11,74 49,00 
Egypt 12,00 87,00 31,28 30,20 
Tunisia 12,00 106,00 22,69 36,80 
Yemen 4,00 46,00 3,73 12,40 
 
The result from this comparison does not display any clear difference between the 
two groups, except for possibly in the amount of daily newspapers. However, the 
statistical analysis does not show any significant difference between the two 
groups. As exhibited in previous comparisons, Yemen is here the least developed 
country when it comes to media exposure and mass communications.  
 
Media exposure and mass communications - Comparing mean values 
State of Democratisation 
Telephone lines 
(per 100 people) 
Mobile cellular 
subscriptions 
(per 100 
people) 
Daily 
Newspapers (per 
1,000 People) 
Internet users 
(per 100 
people) 
Minor Change 13,667 91,667 47,180 39,967 
Major Change 9,333 79,667 19,233 26,467 
 
The comparison of mean values between the two groups shows the same 
contradictory pattern as previous comparisons. It is indicated, although not 
statistically significant, that the group with minor change is made up of the most 
developed countries.  
8.1.2 Reflections – First part 
 
This analysis shows no support for the stipulated hypothesis that economic 
development, including socioeconomic development, is believed to explain the 
state of democratisation in the country. According to the hypothesis, countries 
with a strong economic and socioeconomic development are supposed to have 
reached a higher degree of democratisation than those with a weaker 
development. The result from this analysis displays no support for such claims. 
The result does instead suggest that there is an opposite relationship. Those 
countries with minor political changes are more developed than the group of 
countries with major changes, however, this connection is not statistically 
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significant. Nevertheless, when comparing a limited amount of cases it is 
sometimes difficult to achieve a statistically significant difference. Only six 
countries are compared here, and it is possible that the method requires more 
cases in order to distinguish a statistically proven pattern. For this reason, one 
should not see the statistical significance as an absolute requirement to prove that 
there is a difference between the two groups of countries.  
 
The analysis further shows that there are two countries which are significantly 
different from the others, and would be regarded as outliers in this comparison. 
When comparing with the other countries it is shown that Lebanon is the most 
developed country, while Yemen is the least. This is generally true for Yemen, 
while Lebanon is not ranked as the most developed country for every indicator.  
8.1.3 Second part 
 
In the next part of the analysis Lebanon and Yemen have been excluded, i.e. one 
country from each group. Both countries are significantly different from the other 
selected countries in terms of development. Lebanon does as well have missing 
values on two of the variables, which hampers the comparison. For these reasons, 
a second analysis is done in order to try to distinguish a clearer pattern between 
the two groups. To put this in a more global context and to make it more 
illustrative for the reader each value on the variables has been compared to the 
world median and mean value. These have then been sorted, and colour-coded, 
into three categories, ‘Low’, ‘Medium’, and ‘High’. Statistically, this represents 
the 33th percentile, 67th percentile and the 100th percentile of the world’s 
countries.  
 
Economic development 
Country 
Gross National 
Income Per 
Capita (PPP 
2008 $) 
Electric 
Power 
Consumption 
(kWh) Per 
Capita 
Agriculture, 
value added (% 
of GDP) 
Industry, 
value 
added (% 
of GDP) 
Services, 
etc., value 
added (% 
of GDP) 
Distribution of 
Family 
Income, Gini 
Index 
Urban 
population 
(% of total) 
Jordan 
5 956,00 
(Medium) 
2 225,57 
(Medium) 
3,00 
(Low) 
31,00 
(High) 
66,00 
(Medium) 
39,70 
(Medium) 
82,00 
(High) 
Morocco 
4 628,00 
(Medium) 
472,22 
(Low) 
15,00 
(High) 
30,00 
(High) 
55,00 
(Medium) 
40,90 
(Medium) 
57,00 
(Medium) 
Egypt 
5 889,00 
(Medium) 
1 607,93 
(Medium) 
14,00 
(High) 
38,00 
(High) 
48,00 
(Low) 
34,40 
(Medium) 
43,00 
(Medium) 
Tunisia 
7 979,00 
(Medium) 
1 349,97 
(Medium) 
8,00 
(Medium) 
31,00 
(High) 
61,00 
(Medium) 
40,00 
(Medium) 
66,00 
(Medium) 
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Socioeconomic development 
Country 
UNDP 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Mortality 
rate, 
infant (per 
1,000 live 
births) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(Years) 
Literacy 
rate, adult 
total (% 
of people 
ages 15 
and 
above) 
School 
enrolment, 
primary (% 
gross) 
School 
enrolment, 
secondary 
(% gross) 
School 
enrolment, 
tertiary (% 
gross) 
Public 
spending 
on 
education, 
total (% of 
GDP) 
Jordan 
,6810 
(Medium) 
18,00 
(Medium) 
73,10 
(Medium) 
93,00 
(Medium) 
92,00 
(Low) 
87,00 
(Medium) 
38,00 
(Medium) 
4,90 
(Medium) 
Morocco 
,5670 
(Low) 
29,00 
(Medium) 
71,80 
(Medium) 
56,00 
(Low) 
111,00 
(High) 
64,00 
(Low) 
13,00 
(Low) 
5,40 
(Medium) 
Egypt 
,6200 
(Medium) 
19,00 
(Medium) 
70,50 
(Medium) 
72,00 
(Low) 
106,00 
(Medium) 
72,00 
(Low) 
32,00 
(Medium) 
3,80 
(Medium) 
Tunisia 
,6830 
(Medium) 
15,00 
(Medium) 
74,30 
(Medium) 
78,00 
(Low) 
110,00 
(High) 
90,00 
(Medium) 
36,00 
(Medium) 
6,20 
(High) 
 
 
Media exposure and mass communications 
Country 
Telephone 
lines (per 
100 
people) 
Mobile 
cellular 
subscriptions 
(per 100 
people) 
Daily 
Newspapers 
(per 1,000 
People) 
Internet 
users (per 
100 
people) 
Jordan 
8,00 
(Medium) 
107,00 
(Medium) 
74,23 
(Medium) 
27,20 
(Medium) 
Morocco 
12,00 
(Medium) 
100,00 
(Medium) 
11,74 
(Low) 
49,00 
(High) 
Egypt 
12,00 
(Medium) 
87,00 
(Medium) 
31,28 
(Medium) 
30,20 
(Medium) 
Tunisia 
12,00 
(Medium) 
106,00 
(Medium) 
22,69 
(Medium) 
36,80 
(Medium) 
 
By examining the three tables above, it shows that the pattern is still inconclusive 
when the countries are compared between the groups. The result shows that 
Morocco is the least developed among the four countries, while Tunisia seems to 
be the most developed, closely followed by Jordan. Nevertheless the difference 
between the two groups is less distinctive as in the previous comparison where 
Lebanon and Yemen were included. In general, it is safe to say that the two 
groups of countries are in many aspects similar. This does of course cause a 
problem when the most similar systems design is used as a method. The 
difference in the dependent variable cannot be explained by differences in the 
independent variables.  
When examining the comparison with the rest of the world, these countries 
are in general somewhere in the middle, judging by the ‘Medium’-ranking in 
many of the variables. Morocco stands out here and is placed above or below the 
world median in several variables. The four countries all have a strong industrial 
sector, but at the same time a low literacy rate (except for Jordan).  
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8.1.4 Reflections – Second part 
Looking back at the modernisation theory, both Lipset and Hadenius claimed that 
socioeconomic development was of significant importance for democratisation. 
Tunisia is, compared to the other countries, the most socioeconomic developed 
country, which in line with the theory could explain the state of democratisation 
there. However this does not explain why Jordan, the next most developed 
country, did not experience any major political changes. While at the same time 
why Egypt, which is less socioeconomic developed than Jordan, experienced 
major political changes. Hadenius (1992) concluded that literacy rate and infant 
mortality rate had the best explanatory power for democratisation. This is, 
however, not supported in this analysis. All four countries have similar infant 
mortality rates, and a low literacy rate, with the exception of Jordan which has a 
significantly higher literacy than the others. By further complicating the pattern, a 
cluster analysis on these four countries was conducted. The analysis takes into 
account all the variables, and tries to ‘cluster’ the most similar countries together 
into groups (Hair et al. 2010:509-534; Körner & Wahlgren 2005:175-181). The 
result showed that Jordan and Tunisia were the most similar countries, while 
Egypt and Morocco were more similar to each other than the other two countries 
(see Appendix B). This as well indicates that the modernisation theory is not able 
to explain the variation in the state of democratisation between the countries. 
How could this variation then be explained? One difference between the two 
groups of countries, which is not accounted for here, is their different political 
systems. Jordan and Morocco are both monarchies, while Tunisia and Egypt are 
republics. The literature examined for this study, puts much weight behind this 
factor, and shows how the Arab monarchies have been strongly resilient during 
the Arab Spring (see chapter 4). This does fall outside the scope of this analysis, 
but could nonetheless be one of the explanations behind this variation in the state 
of democratisation (alternative explanations, including this factor, are discussed in 
section 8.3).  
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8.2 The external factors 
This section addresses Huntington’s theory regarding the third wave of 
democratisation. Huntington listed five major factors that contributed significantly 
to the occurrence of the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991a:45f). This 
study will focus on the three - for this study - most relevant factors, the deepening 
legitimacy problems, the unprecedented global economic growth, and the 
snowballing-effect. While the previous section tested the modernisation theory on 
the Arab Spring, Huntington’s theory will only be controlled for. The overall 
questions to guide this analysis are: 1) Did the Arab Spring lack any of the 
external conditions or prerequisites needed for the third wave of democratisation? 
2) How does this relate to the modernisation theory and the Arab Spring? And 3) 
Could this help to explain the variation of the political state of democratisation in 
the selected countries? 
8.2.1 Deepening legitimacy problems 
The first major factor that Huntington lists is the deepening legitimacy problems 
of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely 
accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful performance, 
and their inability to maintain "performance legitimacy" due to economic (and 
sometimes military) failure (Huntington 1991b:13). If we examine it closer, this 
factor could be divided into two parts.  
The first part is the widely accepted democratic values which threatens the 
legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. In a world where democracy has become the 
norm, it becomes more and more difficult for an authoritarian regime to motivate 
and legitimise its ruling for the people. The world has for many years, since the 
beginning of the third wave in 1974, seen an increase of democratic states 
(Diamond 2011). According to Freedom House’s ranking from 2010, just before 
the Arab Spring, 87 countries in the world were ranked as ‘Free’, representing 45 
percent of the world’s states. Furthermore, 60 countries were ranked as ‘Partly 
Free’, or 31 percent of the world’s countries. A total of 47 countries were deemed 
as ‘Not Free’ (Puddington 2011:21). As the data shows, a strong majority of the 
world’s countries are either ranked as ‘Free’ or ‘Partly Free’. This would support 
the idea that democratic values have become more widely accepted in the world. 
It would therefore be regarded as a threat to legitimacy of the authoritarian 
regimes in the Arab world, and one factor behind the Arab Spring.  
The second part is the regime’s inability to maintain “performance 
legitimacy”, which follows the first part. When democratic values become widely 
accepted in the world, it becomes crucial for the regime to legitimise its existence 
and its authoritarian system’s raison d’être for the people. The risk is otherwise 
that people starts questioning the regime and raises demands for democracy. It is 
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therefore important for the regime to maintain its “performance legitimacy” 
which, according to Huntington, could fail due to an economic or sometimes 
military failure (Huntington 1991a:45-58). An economic failure could come in the 
form of rising food prices, increasing poverty and unemployment, as well as 
increasing inflation. In the Arab world many of these indicators of an economic 
failure were present during the time of the Arab Spring (The Economist 2011:26; 
Salih 2013:187; Hoffman & Jamal 2012; Joffé 2011). The economic failures in 
many of the Arab countries were unsurprisingly a problem for the regimes, which 
undermined their performance legitimacy. Globally this economic failure might 
have been sparked by the global financial crisis of 2008, which certainly affected 
the Arab countries (Ben-Meir 2012). Consequently, there was a global spike in 
food and energy costs in the second half of 2010, which had a direct impact on 
populations already living close to the poverty line in the Arab world (Joffé 
2011:509). This is similar to the oil price hike of 1973-74, that triggered a global 
economic recession which significantly undermined Third World authoritarian 
regimes’ efforts to use economic performance to bolster their legitimacy 
(Huntington 1991a:41-51). Whether the regimes were fully or partially 
responsible for the country’s economic failure were of less importance as it 
threatened their legitimacy as an authoritarian regime.  
When it comes to military failure, it is more difficult to discern a particular 
failure that might have threatened the performance legitimacy of the regime. 
Historically one of the most prominent examples of a “military failure”, in 
relation to democratisation, ought to be Argentina. They were defeated by Great 
Britain in the Falkland war in 1982, which undermined the Argentinian military 
government, and led to an election of a civilian president and government the year 
after (Huntington 1991a:22f; 104f). However, it is difficult to distinguish a similar 
case of military failure in the Arab world prior to the Arab Spring. In the six 
countries selected for this study, only Yemen was in an armed conflict in 2010, 
according to UCDP’s data10. The government in Yemen has, since 2005, an 
ongoing armed conflict with the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
(UCDP 2010). It remains unclear, and needs further analysis, whether this armed 
conflict contained military failures that affected Yemen’s performance legitimacy. 
However, it probably has a negative impact and contributed to the situation in 
Yemen. 
The two parts of this factor - the widely accepted democratic values in the 
world and the economic or military failure are intertwined and depend on each 
other. Hypothetically, if democratic values were not widely accepted in the world, 
it is possible that authoritarian regimes would have maintained their performance 
legitimacy even when faced with economic or military failures. On the other hand 
it is possible that widely accepted democratic values would not have sufficed as a 
catalyst for democratisation on its own if the people in the Arab countries were 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which collects information on a large number of aspects of armed 
violence since 1946. UCDP is a part of the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. - 
www.ucdp.uu.se/database 
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satisfied with their economic situation. Nevertheless this remains a hypothetical 
argument, as these two parts were clearly present in the Arab countries prior to the 
Arab Spring.  
Could this factor then help to explain the variation of the state of 
democratisation in the six selected countries for this study? It is possible that in 
the three countries with a major political change, i.e. Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, 
the economic situations were worse than in Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco. Hence 
these authoritarian regimes were regarded by the people as responsible for the 
economic failure, and in Yemen even a plausible military failure. In the other 
group of countries, with minor political changes, the economic situations were 
better, and they were able to maintain their performance legitimacy. The data 
analysed in the previous section (see section 8.1) shows some support for the idea, 
the countries with minor changes were more developed than the other group. 
However, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant, 
and the data used is for economic development, and not a perfect indicator for 
“economic failure”. Nonetheless it is an interesting idea, but would require a new 
set of data in order to analyse, to determine if there is support for this argument.  
8.2.2 The unprecedented global economic growth 
Huntington’s second factor is the unprecedented global economic growth of the 
1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and expanded the urban 
middle class in many countries (Huntington 1991b:13). This is certainly 
interesting as it strongly relates to the modernisation theory, but also somewhat 
conversely to the first factor.  
The earlier part of the third wave was partly ignited by the strong global 
economic growth of the 1960s. However, contemporary events during the Arab 
Spring might also be traced back to a global economic growth. Globally we have 
seen an economic growth in recent years, albeit not unprecedented, but still 
significant. This shows how external factors, as a global economic growth, could 
affect internal factors in the Arab countries, which have naturally also experienced 
a strong economic development, especially in human development (Kuhn 2012). 
This was further analysed in the previous section, where the modernisation theory 
was used as an internal factor. However, it remains uncertain if recent global 
economic growth, could match the one in the 1960s. The recent years have more 
been defined by the financial crisis of 2008, than the global economic growth.  
Relating to Huntington’s first factor, at a first glimpse, it would appear as the 
third wave was both affected by economic failure, and by economic growth, a 
rather contradictory relationship. Yet, the indicators for economic growth in a 
country and for economic failure, or rather economic inequality, are not the same. 
As discussed in the previous part, it is possible that economic failure or economic 
inequality could have had some effect on the variation of the state of 
democratisation in the Arab Spring. While there has been an economic growth 
globally and in the country itself, this wealth and growth is not always equally 
distributed to the people. In relation to this, Thompson’s article (1993), previously 
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discussed in the theory-section, could here be an interesting contribution to the 
discussion. He argues that Singapore and Malaysia were able to successfully 
legitimise their non-democratic rule by an outstanding economic performance, 
while at the same time limiting the income inequality in the country (Thompson 
1993:471; cf. Acemoglu & Robinson 2006:353f). Seen in relation to the Arab 
Spring, it is possible that the economic failure in the Arab world is due to failure 
in limiting the income inequality. This does also relate to the first part regarding 
performance legitimacy.  
8.2.3 The Snowballing-effect 
The Snowballing-effect refers to the demonstration effect or transitions earlier in 
the third wave which stimulated and provided models for subsequent efforts at 
democratisation (Huntington 1991a:46). So where did the snowballing or the 
demonstration effect for the Arab Spring begin? With a strict interpretation of 
Huntington, it is likely that the models for the democratisation could be derived 
from those countries that experienced this wave earlier in the third wave. For 
instance Portugal and Greece in 1974, or Spain in 1975-1979, this would also 
represent the countries geographically closest to the Arab world (Huntington 
1991a:21-24). One could here argue that the Arab countries sought inspiration 
from the democratisations in Europe between 1974 and 1979, and that this 
provided a model for them. However, the Arab Spring could also be regarded as a 
“delayed” third wave of democratisation. Whereas the events in Portugal and 
Greece represent the initial and founding inspiration or model for democratisation. 
It is likely that there was another democratisation closer in time that could be tied 
to the snowballing. Since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in December 2010, it 
is natural to assume that this was the strongest source of inspiration and also 
where the snowballing-effect started in this case. This is more probable than 
claiming that the Arab Spring was the immediate effect of what started in Portugal 
1974. 
How could this then explain the variation between the Arab countries in terms 
of their state of democratisation? The protests in Tunisia spread to neighbouring 
countries and further out in the region in a matter of weeks. The distribution of 
this news and the beginning of democratisation in Tunisia were fuelled and 
facilitated by far better means of communication than in the earlier stages of the 
Arab Spring. From the literature-review there is strong support for the idea that 
with the help of TV, phones, Internet, and social media, the people throughout the 
region were made aware of the news, and thus the snowballing had begun. The 
geographical proximity to Tunisia made no difference in this case. Protests sprung 
up in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen in January (see chapter 7), even in the remote corner 
of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman experienced its first protests as early as in 
January 17 2011 (Worrall 2012:98). Morocco and Lebanon joined the scene a bit 
later, in the end of February. Nevertheless, this does not indicate any significant 
discrepancy in the snowballing. The delayed outbreak in Morocco and Lebanon 
might not be that important as the Arab Spring eventually arrived there only a 
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month later. In the earlier stages of the third wave the snowballing took years, 
compared to a couple of weeks or months during the Arab Spring. It is practically 
impossible to prove that one single country was more or less affected by the 
snowballing. In a globalised world, it is natural to assume that the whole Arab 
world was affected collectively, rather than trying to measure the effect on each 
individual country.  
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8.3 Alternative explanations 
After analysing the internal factors it seems there is rather weak support for the 
stipulated hypothesis that modernisation leads to democratisation, even when 
controlled for external factors. Those countries that have experienced major 
changes during the Arab Spring are in many ways similar in terms of 
modernisation as those with minor political changes. The result does indeed call 
for alternative explanations to why there is a variation between the countries and 
how their current state of democratisation could be explained. This chapter will 
therefore offer some suggestions for alternative explanations, by looking at the 
countries with minor political changes, i.e. Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco. 
8.3.1 Jordan 
Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont (2012) review different explanations as to why 
Jordan did not experience the same social uprisings as neighbouring countries did 
during the Arab Spring. One argument is that the situation in Jordan was not as 
severe as in other Arab countries, and the people’s grievance was not nearly as 
acute. The protest movement did, for instance, not call for the toppling of the 
regime, but rather demanded political reforms. A national survey conducted by 
the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan showed that 80 percent 
of the national population did not support the protests, 55 percent of which 
claimed that these events “led to chaos and sabotage and undermined security 
and stability” (Helfont & Helfont 2012:90). The Jordanian society is also said to 
be divided between East Bankers and West Bankers, or Jordanians and Palestine 
descendants. There are as well ideological divisions in the country, where 
Islamists11 are the most organised opposition here, but liberal youth activists are 
another driving force behind the Arab Spring in Jordan. The conservative 
elements, rooted in East Bank tribal politics, do also play a significant role in 
Jordanian politics. Although these groups do not trust each other, they do trust the 
king. Where “Abdullah II is seen by most as an arbiter between various groups 
and a bulwark against the chaos that has engulfed neighbouring countries”. It is 
further suggested that the Jordanians favour economic reforms before political and 
democratic reforms (Helfont & Helfont 2012:84-91). The economic and political 
reforms that Jordan undertook during the Arab Spring were not the first in the 
country’s history. The political re-liberalisation in 1989 is still regarded as the 
most important, but the king has traditionally used reforms when faced with 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest and most active faction here. The Jordanian Brotherhood’s political 
party, The Islamic Action Front (IAF) is both tolerated and well integrated into the Jordanian political landscape 
(Helfont & Helfont 2012:87).  
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economic or political crisis in Jordan (Ryan & Schwedler 2004; Rumman 2012; 
Robinson 1998; Kamrava 1998). S.E. Finer (1970) described Jordan as a “façade 
democracy”, the definition of a façade democracy was "A system where liberal-
democratic institutions, processes and safeguards are established by law but are 
in practice so manipulated or violated by a historic oligarchy as to stay in office" 
and it "is the palace that rules from behind the manipulated democratic forms" 
(Finer 1970:441; 460f). Beverley Milton-Edwards (1993) revisited this notion 
years later and came to a similar conclusion, no evidence that contradicted Finer’s 
classification of Jordan as a façade democracy was found. She further concluded 
that the democratisation process in Jordan was manipulated by the regime and the 
king to perpetuate their own rule (Milton-Edwards 1993:201). Glen E. Robinson 
did also study the reforms in Jordan, but gave it a different term. He called it a 
“defensive democratisation”-strategy. By undertaking sufficient reforms, but 
without altering the core structures of power in Jordan, the king was here able to 
assure his political longevity (Robinson 1998:387). Considering the Jordanian 
tradition of façade democracy or defensive democratisation, it might be suggested 
that the latest reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring is merely a way for king 
Abdullah II to placate the people and preserve his power, thus avoiding any major 
political changes.  
8.3.2 Morocco 
It is said that religious legitimacy could explain some part of the resilience of the 
monarchies in the region. Both king Abdullah II of Jordan and King Muhammed 
VI of Morocco claim to be descendants of Mohammed, which clearly gives them 
much Islamic legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens12. Muhammed VI had also 
begun modernising the state’s government long before the Arab Spring, beginning 
from 1999 when he ascended the throne, with reforms aiming to reduce poverty 
and corruption, and to improve Morocco’s human-rights record. The king’s 
reforms have had positive effects in the last decades, for instance with reduced 
poverty, a more open political space, strengthened rights for women, and by 
allowing more political parties to function. The king’s political and economic 
reforms combined with his religious legitimacy explain why he has been able to 
stick to power, at least for now (Miller 2011; Traub 2012; Joffé 2011:511). 
Morocco is said to claim that they have chosen a “third path” between democracy 
and tyranny in the wake of the Arab Spring, thus constituting the “Moroccan 
exceptionalism”. However, while Morocco still has the same social, economic, 
and demographic problems that led to mass protests elsewhere in the Arab world, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 This share many similarities with the “divine right of king”-doctrine which was used to justify monarchy in 
early modern Europe. It claimed that kings “received their earthly power by divine mandate and, as a result, 
could not be subject to any temporal or secular authority”. The king’s right to rule was said to be based on the 
law of god and of nature, therefore active resistance to a king was a sin ensuring damnation (Reiner 2010; CEE 
2013). Kings are only accountable to god alone according to this doctrine (Figgis 1914:5-8).  
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it is unlikely that the “third path” will be a realistic alternative to democracy in the 
long-run (Traub 2012).  
8.3.3 Lebanon 
The unifying characteristics of Jordan and Morocco are that they are both 
monarchies. By revisiting both the literature-review, but also empirical result, it 
clearly shows how monarchies have been particularly resilient in the face of 
political challenges like the Arab Spring. However this does not help explaining 
the case of Lebanon.  
Lebanon has been regarded as a special case for many years, with its own 
transformational revolution, the Cedar Revolution, going on since 2005. Syria’s 
strong influence in the country has had its effect on Lebanon. For most Arabs, 
Lebanon has always been an anomaly (Kühnhardt 2012:59; Abrams 2012:27). 
Some Lebanese analysts and politicians have even claimed that the Arab Spring 
was inspired by the Cedar Revolution (Khashan 2011). Lebanon has a long-
running system of confessional democracy, which reserves specific roles for 
different sectarian groups (Kuhn 2012:675f). As previously mentioned (see 
chapter 7; Hermez 2011), protests in Lebanon were more directed towards the 
sectarian political system than the regime itself. If we combine this with other 
factors such as the previous Cedar revolution, and that a strong human 
development has left them better-off than other countries in the region (Kuhn 
2012:675f) – this might contribute to explain why Lebanon has not experienced 
any major uprisings during the Arab Spring. Revisiting the literature-review, and 
the Economist's "Shoe Thrower's index", Lebanon was among the countries with 
lowest vulnerability for revolution, and potential for unrest (the Economist 
2011:26) It appears that there was a general weak support for protests in Lebanon, 
at least in comparison with neighbouring countries (Khashan 2011). However, 
there is still a lack of research on Lebanon in relation to the Arab Spring.  
8.3.4 Summary 
Jordan and Morocco share many similarities with Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, in 
terms of level of modernisation. They should therefore have - according to the 
modernisation theory and the stipulated hypothesis - experienced the same major 
political changes. However, a plausible explanation to this exception from the 
hypothesis could be the monarchical political system in Jordan and Morocco. The 
monarch’s legitimacy, and especially their religious legitimacy, offered a stronger 
support for them as leaders than the political leaders in Egypt, Tunisia and 
Yemen. Another reason is the fact that both Abdullah II and Muhammed VI had 
already made many economic and political reforms in their countries, the people’s 
grievance were therefore not as acute as in other Arab countries. Both monarchs 
are also regarded as very skilful politicians, and have been able to abide to 
people’s demands without jeopardising their own political power. The terms of 
  44 
façade democracy and defensive democratisation, previously mentioned, are truly 
vivid examples of this. In the case of Lebanon there are several factors that might 
explain why they did not experience any major political changes during the Arab 
Spring. While Lebanon had already experienced a civil war and a revolution of its 
own, it is plausible that the people were not as interested or keen to stage another 
uprising. Lebanon is also by far the most developed country in terms of economic 
development, compared to the other five countries in this study. Once again it 
might be suggested that the people’s grievance were not as acute. The Lebanese 
sectarian political system could also have been a hindrance for an efficient 
uprising.  
There are of course several other plausible alternative explanations explaining 
the state and variation of democratisation after the Arab Spring. The literature-
review represents an overview of other research done in this area. For instance, 
the role of the GCC and Saudi Arabia, social media, and economic factors that 
take into account economic inequalities. However, to give these other factors a 
comprehensive and feasible analysis would require a study of its own. This 
section has instead focused on giving some alternative explanations to those 
countries with minor political changes, in relation to the purpose and scope of this 
study. 
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9 Conclusion 
This study has focused on democratisation in the wake of the Arab Spring. Focus 
has lied on six selected countries. Half of them have experienced major political 
changes - Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen - while the other three - Jordan, Lebanon and 
Morocco – have had minor political changes during the Arab Spring. These two 
groups have been compared to each other in order to explain the recent political 
state of democratisation, as well as finding which factor(s) could explain the 
variation of democratisation between these two groups. This has been done with 
the help of the modernisation theory, which it has been tested for, while 
Huntington's theory about the third wave of democratisation has been controlled 
for. As a complement this study also reviews other plausible explanations for the 
state of democratisation and the variation between the countries.  
 
Contrary to the modernisation theory and the stipulated hypothesis, this study has 
found no support for the notion that economic and socioeconomic development 
would explain the variation of democratisation in the six selected countries. The 
result does instead suggest that the countries with minor political changes were 
the most developed countries, however, this has not been fully supported, and is 
not statistically proven. It would rather be said that several of the countries show 
strong similarities in terms of development. This was also controlled for with 
Huntington's theory about the third wave of democratisation, which shows that 
several of the major factors that characterise the third wave of democratisation 
have also been present in the case of the Arab Spring. In other words, the external 
preconditions for a wave of democratisation were all fulfilled. The conclusion is 
that the variation between the countries in terms of the state of democratisation 
could not be explained by the modernisation theory. In the analysis of external 
factors there are some arguments connecting the Arab Spring with the global 
economic crisis together with the authoritarian regime’s economic failure. 
Alternative explanations that have been reviewed for this study suggest that the 
monarch’s strong legitimacy and willingness to make concessions, in the form of 
both political and economic reforms, might have saved Jordan and Morocco from 
any major political changes, while Lebanon seems to be regarded as a special case 
with a previous revolution. 
 
The Arab Spring is in many ways an ambitious case to study. It has been 
particularly difficult to analyse because it is in many ways still on-going, and it is 
still very uncertain which direction it will take. Recent events in Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Yemen would even suggest that these countries are not developing towards a 
democracy. However, this study has focused on the initial phases of the 
democratisation in the year after the Arab Spring, and not the more recent events. 
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It is thereto important to note that the democratisation process takes time, and 
often decades. In Freedom House’s latest edition (2012), Egypt and Tunisia have 
moved up from a rating of “Not Free” to “Partly Free”, which should be seen as a 
good sign, while Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen remains where they were 
in 2010 (Puddington 2013).  
 
9.1 Suggestions for further research 
Throughout this study several interesting factors, apart from the modernisation 
theory, have been touched upon. Many of these other aspects and factors could 
certainly help further explain the variation of the state of democratisation during 
the Arab Spring. This section brings up three suggestions for further research on 
this topic. 
 
While the modernisation theory seems to have had a weak explanatory power on 
the Arab Spring, both the literature-review and Huntington’s theory, point out 
other economic factors. One interesting factor for future research would be to look 
at how the global economic crisis affected the Arab world as an external factor, 
and further look at each country to analyse how these were able to cope with it. 
Some countries were possibly more prepared and thus less vulnerable to the 
economic failure. For instance in the analysis with the modernisation theory, it 
was partly suggested that those countries with minor political change were more 
developed than the other group. It is possible that the people in these countries 
were hence less prone to uphold longer demonstrations and demand a regime-
shift. This would however require another set of data, more than just variables 
focusing on economic development. It would here be important to look at 
different indicators for economic and social inequality, to measure the people’s 
economic situation. Indicators such as number of people living in poverty, 
unemployment-rate, inflation rates, and wealth distribution, as well as food and 
energy costs.  
 
The monarchy’s resilience during the Arab Spring is also another important factor 
to take into consideration in future research. The major ruling monarchies in the 
world reside in the Arab world, and have so far been relatively unaffected by the 
Arab Spring. It would be interesting to widen the analysis and also include other 
absolute monarchies in the Arab world, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia. This 
would further test monarchy’s resilience as an important factor. 
 
In this study, six countries were selected for the analysis. Although, these 
countries only represent a small part of the whole Arab world. For obvious 
reasons it was not possible to include every country, as that would certainly have 
complicated the analysis. However, it still makes it difficult to draw any 
conclusion on the whole Arab world. For that reason, further research would 
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preferable include other countries in the region, and apply the same analysis on 
these. It is possible that this would generate a different result, or further strengthen 
the result from this study.  
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Executive Summary 
On 17 December 2010, the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire 
in the city of Sidi Bouzid, in Tunisia. This act of protest, and desperation, became 
the catalyst - and marked the beginning - of the Arab Spring. It began with 
protests in Tunisia, but it soon spread across the whole Arab world, leaving 
virtually no country in the region unaffected. It caused a major turmoil and 
change, but to a very different degree depending on the country. In some countries 
there were major protests and unrest, sometimes leading to the government being 
overthrown, for instance as in Tunisia and Egypt, while the protests escalated to 
civil war in other countries like Libya and Syria. There were, however, several 
countries where the political unrest did not lead to any major changes, where the 
Arab Spring left the authoritarian regimes moderately unaffected. This illustrates 
a puzzling and interesting variation among countries in the region – countries that 
are in many ways similar - but where the Arab Spring had a very different degree 
of effect. How could this be explained, and which factors caused this variation of 
the state of democratisation? This study takes a closer look at the initial phase of 
the Arab Spring, and try to explain the variation in the state of democratisation.  
The Arab Spring is a remarkable case of how civil protests and demands for 
political reforms could spread from one country to a whole region of countries in 
a matter of weeks. The Arab Spring as a phenomenon is highly relevant and 
topical as a case of democratisation within the field of Political Science. The Arab 
Spring is here studied as a case of democratisation or democratic transition. More 
precisely this study focus on the political state of democratisation in the countries 
in the region.  
This is analysed with the help of the modernisation theory, while controlling 
for Huntington’s theory about waves of democratisation. The preliminary 
hypothesis is that modernisation, in terms of economic and socioeconomic 
development, helps to explain the variation in the state of democratisation. While 
some countries have experienced a major political change after the Arab Spring, 
other countries only have a low degree of change, thus the state of 
democratisation varies a lot between the countries in the region. The aim of this 
study is to explain this variation. The dependent variable is therefore measuring 
the state of democratisation, after the initial part of the Arab Spring, separating 
between major and minor political change. In relation to the sub-question, this 
study aims to identify the factor(s) behind the variation of democratisation during 
the Arab Spring. 
 
The main research-question: 
- How can the recent political state of democratisation, in the wake of the 
Arab Spring, be explained? 
  49 
Sub-question: 
- Which factor(s) could help to explain the variation of democratisation in 
the region? 
 
Within the toolbox of democratisation theories, two main types of theories have 
been selected in order to explain the recent state of democratisation. The first one 
is modernisation theory, which takes into account the states’ internal features and 
characteristics (i.e. economic growth and socioeconomic development). This 
theory, originally formulated by Martin Seymour Lipset (1959), links economic 
development and democratisation together. The second theory discusses the 
external factors that are presumed to trigger a democratisation of a state. This 
theory assumes that a state’s democratisation could be explained by more external 
and global factors, rather than just its internal characteristics. Samuel P. 
Huntington’s (1991) idea about waves of democratisation is here the most 
prominent theory.  According to his theory, democratisation has occurred in - so 
far - three successive waves in the world.  
 
The chosen method is a comparative politics method known as the most similar 
systems design. The design of the method is created as a comparison between very 
similar cases, which only differs in the dependent variable. Simplified it means 
that difference is explained by difference. This is done with the assumption that it 
would make it easier to identify the independent variable which explains the 
outcome in the dependent variable. Ideally only one, or a few, independent 
variables will differ between the countries, and will consequently be regarded as 
the determining factor(s). This method is further complemented with a statistic 
method. The chosen cases are divided into two groups, conditional on the 
dependent variable. These two groups are compared, in order to measure if the 
difference between them are statistically significant. This method is a good 
complement to the comparison, as it will further strengthen the validity of the 
result.  
 
Six countries, or cases, are selected for this study, based on four different criteria. 
The main criterion is that the countries are geographically located in the Arab 
world, the region where the Arab Spring occurred. These countries share many 
similarities when it comes to culture, language, and religion, thus suitable for a 
comparison in line with the most similar systems design. For theoretical reasons 
countries that rely heavily on oil and gas have been excluded from the 
comparison. These countries often represent an exception from the modernisation 
theory and thus it complicates comparison with the other countries. Syria has 
furthermore been excluded from the comparison as the civil war is still ongoing 
and its volatile status makes it an uncertain case for the comparison. Based on the 
dependent variable, two groups of countries have been selected. Countries that 
have experienced minor political changes - Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco - and 
countries that have experienced major political changes: Egypt, Tunisia and 
Yemen. 
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Instead of making its own operationalization, this study relies on the work done 
by Axel Hadenius, Martin Seymour Lipset, and Larry Diamond, in which they 
have applied the modernisation theory. However there are also some additional 
variables added in order to complement, as well as modernise the 
operationalizations, for instance a variable measuring the amount of internet and 
cell phone users, UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) is used as a 
complement for measuring socioeconomic development, and a Gini-index as a 
measurement of income inequality is used in order to measure the class structure. 
The indicators or variables are divided into three groups: economic development, 
socioeconomic development, and media exposure and mass communications. The 
material used for the analysis consists mostly of statistical data, i.e. quantified 
variables. One of the main criteria for the selection of data is that the data should 
come from a reliable and well-known source. The main source used for this 
analysis is the World Development Indicators (World Bank), it has been 
complemented - when needed - with data from the CIA World Factbook, as well 
as the Quality of Government (QOG) database. 
 
The analysis consists of three parts. It begins with the analysis of the internal 
factors, in which the modernisation theory is tested on the Arab Spring. The 
second part is the external factors, here represented by Huntington’s theory about 
waves of democratisation. Important to note is that this theory will only be 
controlled for, and not tested. The third and last part of this analysis offers some 
alternative explanations, while taking into account the result from the previous 
two parts. That part will take a closer look at the three countries that only 
experienced minor political changes, i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco.  
 
Contrary to the modernisation theory and the stipulated hypothesis, this study has 
found no support for the notion that economic and socioeconomic development 
would explain the variation of democratisation in the six selected countries. The 
result does instead suggest that the countries with minor political changes were 
the most developed countries, however, this has not been fully supported, and is 
not statistically proven. It would rather be said that several of the countries show 
strong similarities in terms of development. This was also controlled for with 
Huntington's theory about the third wave of democratisation, which shows that 
several of the major factors that characterise the third wave of democratisation 
have also been present in the case of the Arab Spring. The conclusion is that the 
variation between the countries in terms of the state of democratisation could not 
be explained by the modernisation theory. In the analysis of external factors there 
are some arguments connecting the Arab Spring with the global economic crisis 
together with the authoritarian regime’s economic failure.  
Alternative explanations that have been reviewed for this study suggest that 
the monarch’s strong legitimacy and willingness to make concessions, in the form 
of both political and economic reforms, might have saved Jordan and Morocco 
from any major political changes, while Lebanon seems to be regarded as a 
special case with a previous revolution. The monarch’s legitimacy, and especially 
their religious legitimacy, offered a stronger support for them as leaders than the 
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political leaders in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. Another reason is the fact that both 
Abdullah II and Muhammed VI had already made many economic and political 
reforms in their countries, the people’s grievance were therefore not as acute as in 
other Arab countries. Both monarchs are also regarded as very skilful politicians, 
and have been able to abide to people’s demands without jeopardising their own 
political power. While Lebanon had already experienced a civil war and a 
revolution of its own, it is plausible that the people were not as interested or keen 
to stage another uprising. Lebanon is also by far the most developed country in 
terms of economic development, compared to the other five countries in this 
study. Once again it might be suggested that the people’s grievance were not as 
acute. 
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11 Appendix A 
11.1 Variables used in the analysis 
In this chapter all the variables used for the analysis are listed. The description of 
each variable is derived from each source, in most cases the World Bank. For 
more information about each variable, see respective listed source.  
11.1.1 Economic development 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP 2008 $) – (ed_GNIpercapita) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
GNI (gross national income) per capita Sum of value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in 
the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 
employees and property income) from abroad, divided by midyear population. 
Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. When expressed in PPP US dollar terms, it is 
converted to international dollars using PPP rates. An international dollar has the 
same purchasing power over GDP that a US dollar has in the United States (HDI 
2010:224). 
 
Source: UNDP 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/ 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf 
 
Electric power consumption (kWh) per Capita – (ed_EnergyPerCapita) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and 
combined heat and power plants less transmission, distribution, and 
transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants. 
 
The variable was computed by dividing each countries’ total electric power 
consumption with the population, in order to have the variable in per capita.  
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH 
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Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) – (ed_Agriculture) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and 
fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is 
the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added 
is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), 
revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as 
the denominator. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS 
 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) – (ed_Industry) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC 
divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also 
reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value 
added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of 
value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is 
used as the denominator. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS 
 
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) – (ed_Service)  
Year of measurement: 2010 
Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in 
wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and 
government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, 
health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service 
charges, import duties, and any statistical discrepancies noted by national 
compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. The industrial origin of value 
added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), 
revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as 
the denominator. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
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http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS 
 
Distribution of family income - Gini index - (ed_Gini) 
Year of measurement: Jordan and Morocco 2007, Lebanon [data missing], Egypt 
2001, Yemen and Tunisia 2005. 
 
This index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income 
in a country. The index is calculated from the Lorenz curve, in which cumulative 
family income is plotted against the number of families arranged from the poorest 
to the richest. The index is the ratio of (a) the area between a country's Lorenz 
curve and the 45 degree helping line to (b) the entire triangular area under the 45 
degree line. The more nearly equal a country's income distribution, the closer its 
Lorenz curve to the 45 degree line and the lower its Gini index, e.g., a 
Scandinavian country with an index of 25. The more unequal a country's income 
distribution, the farther its Lorenz curve from the 45 degree line and the higher its 
Gini index, e.g., a Sub-Saharan country with an index of 50. If income were 
distributed with perfect equality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the 45 
degree line and the index would be zero; if income were distributed with perfect 
inequality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the horizontal axis and the right 
vertical axis and the index would be 100. 
 
Source: The CIA World Factbook 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html#48 
 
Urban population (% of total) – (ed_Urban) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national 
statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and 
urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS 
11.1.2 Socioeconomic development 
 
Human Development Index (HDI) value – (sec_Hdi) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
(Lebanon is not included in the HDI due to the unavailability of certain crucial 
data) 
 
A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of 
human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of 
living. (HDI 2010: & 224).  
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Source: UNDP 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/ 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf 
 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) – (sec_Infant) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Level & Trends in Child Mortality. Estimates Developed by the UN Inter-agency 
Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA, 
UNPD). 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN 
 
Life expectancy at birth (Years) – (sec_LifeExpect) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Life expectancy at birth Number of years a new born infant could expect to live if 
prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay 
the same throughout the infant’s life (HDI 2010:224). The life expectancy at birth 
estimates are from World Population Prospects 1950–2050: The2008 Revision 
(UNDESA 2009d), the official source of UN population estimates and 
projections. They are prepared biennially by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs Population Division using data from national vital 
registration systems, population censuses and surveys (HDI 2010:140) 
 
Source: UNDP 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/ 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf 
 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) – (sec_Literacy) 
Year of measurement: 2010 (For Morocco 2009, Tunisia 2008. Value missing in 
WBI-database for Lebanon, replaced with CIA world Factbook, year of 
measurement 2003) 
 
Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and 
above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on 
their everyday life. Generally, ‘literacy’ also encompasses ‘numeracy’, the ability 
to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the 
number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group 
population and multiplying the result by 100. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) and CIA World Factbook 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html 
 
School enrollment, primary (% gross) – (sec_EdPrimary) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
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Gross enrolment ratio. Primary. Total is the total enrollment in primary education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary 
education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and 
under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR 
 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) – (sec_EdSecondary) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Gross enrolment ratio. Secondary. All programmes. Total is the total enrollment 
in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the 
population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the 
inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school 
entrance and grade repetition. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR 
 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) – (sec_EdTertiary) 
Year of measurement: 2010 (For Yemen 2007) 
Gross enrolment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in 
tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage 
of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary 
school leaving. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR 
 
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) – (sec_EducationSpent) 
Year of measurement: 2010 (For Jordan 1999, Morocco 2009, Egypt and Yemen 
2008) 
 
Public expenditure on education as % of GDP is the total public expenditure 
(current and capital) on education expressed as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in a given year. Public expenditure on education 
includes government spending on educational institutions (both public and 
private), education administration, and transfers/subsidies for private entities 
(students/households and other private’s entities). 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS 
 
11.1.3 Media exposure and mass communications 
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Telephone lines (per 100 people) – (me_Telephone) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a subscriber's terminal 
equipment to the public switched telephone network and that have a port on a 
telephone exchange. Integrated services digital network channels and fixed 
wireless subscribers are included. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.MLT.MAIN.P2 
 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) – (me_Cellphone) 
Year of measurement: 2010 
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile 
telephone service using cellular technology, which provide access to the public 
switched telephone network. Post-paid and prepaid subscriptions are included. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2 
 
Daily Newspapers (per 1,000 People) – (me_Newspapers) 
Year of measurement: 1997-2004 
Daily newspapers refer to those published at least four times a week and 
calculated as average circulation (or copies printed) per 1,000 people. Sources: 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (QOG Codebook 2011:199).  
 
Source: QOG 
 
Internet users (per 100 people) – (me_Internet)  
Year of measurement: 2010 
Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 
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12 Appendix B 
This appendix contains the output from the statistical analysis.  
12.1 Comparing mean values 
This section contains the output from the statistical program SPSS. The used 
analyse-method is “Independent Samples T-Test”, which is used to compare the 
mean values of the two groups of countries, and to test if there are any statistically 
significant difference between them. It is especially the two sided significance-test 
(column “Sig. (2-tailed)”) that is important here (Körner & Wahlgren 2005:136-
144; Esaiasson et al. 2012:389f). Neither one of the tested variables show a value 
below 0.05, which means that the difference between the two groups are not 
statistical significant on a 5% significance-level. It is therefore not ruled out that 
the difference between the groups are random.  
12.1.1 Economic Development 
Independent Samples Test 
 t-test for Equality of Means 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Gross National 
Income Per 
Capita (PPP 
2008 $) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,813 4 ,462 2601,33333 3201,30982 -6286,92764 11489,59431 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
,813 3,249 ,472 2601,33333 3201,30982 -7158,37771 12361,04438 
Electric Power 
Consumption 
(kWh) Per 
Capita 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1,087 4 ,338 1798,20384 1653,69667 -2793,19417 6389,60186 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
1,087 2,270 ,379 1798,20384 1653,69667 -4564,28286 8160,69054 
Agriculture, 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
-,485 4 ,653 -2,00000 4,12311 -13,44758 9,44758 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
-,485 3,124 ,660 -2,00000 4,12311 -14,83107 10,83107 
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Industry, value 
added (% of 
GDP) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
-
1,257 
4 ,277 -4,66667 3,71184 -14,97239 5,63906 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
-
1,257 
3,974 ,277 -4,66667 3,71184 -14,99888 5,66555 
Services, etc., 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1,000 4 ,374 6,66667 6,66667 -11,84297 25,17630 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
1,000 4,000 ,374 6,66667 6,66667 -11,84315 25,17648 
Distribution of 
Family 
Income, Gini 
Index 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1,367 3 ,265 2,93333 2,14519 -3,89363 9,76029 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
1,693 2,490 ,207 2,93333 1,73237 -3,27737 9,14404 
Urban 
population (% 
of total) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2,075 4 ,107 28,33333 13,65447 -9,57754 66,24421 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
2,075 3,977 ,107 28,33333 13,65447 -9,66470 66,33137 
 
 
12.1.2  Socioeconomic development 
Independent Samples Test 
 t-test for Equality of Means 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
UNDP Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,419 3 ,704 ,0433333 ,1035303 -,2861462 ,3728129 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,467 2,973 ,672 ,0433333 ,0927206 -,2532439 ,3399105 
Mortality rate, 
infant (per 
1,000 live 
births) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
-,806 4 ,465 -12,00000 14,88474 -53,32667 29,32667 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-,806 2,689 ,485 -12,00000 14,88474 -62,62070 38,62070 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth (Years) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,936 4 ,402 2,86667 3,06141 -5,63317 11,36650 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,936 2,061 ,445 2,86667 3,06141 -9,93812 15,67145 
Literacy rate, 
adult total (% 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,612 4 ,574 7,46667 12,20728 -26,42619 41,35952 
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of people ages 
15 and above) 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,612 2,489 ,592 7,46667 12,20728 -36,31296 51,24630 
School 
enrollment, 
primary (% 
gross) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,184 4 ,863 1,66667 9,04311 -23,44102 26,77436 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,184 3,797 ,863 1,66667 9,04311 -23,97823 27,31156 
School 
enrollment, 
secondary (% 
gross) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,576 4 ,596 8,66667 15,05176 -33,12373 50,45706 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,576 2,990 ,605 8,66667 15,05176 -39,32476 56,65809 
School 
enrollment, 
tertiary (% 
gross) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,625 4 ,566 9,00000 14,41064 -31,01036 49,01036 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,625 3,517 ,570 9,00000 14,41064 -33,27597 51,27597 
Public 
spending on 
education, total 
(% of GDP) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
-,789 4 ,474 -1,06667 1,35195 -4,82029 2,68696 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-,789 3,277 ,483 -1,06667 1,35195 -5,17090 3,03756 
 
 
12.1.3 Media exposure and mass communications 
Independent Samples Test 
 t-test for Equality of Means 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Telephone 
lines (per 100 
people) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,926 4 ,407 4,33333 4,67856 -8,65642 17,32309 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,926 3,563 ,413 4,33333 4,67856 -9,30968 17,97635 
Mobile cellular 
subscriptions 
(per 100 
people) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
,561 4 ,605 12,00000 21,39055 -47,38968 71,38968 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
,561 3,518 ,609 12,00000 21,39055 -50,73934 74,73934 
Daily 
Newspapers 
(per 1,000 
People) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1,381 4 ,239 27,94667 20,22998 -28,22076 84,11409 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
1,381 2,745 ,269 27,94667 20,22998 -39,95899 95,85233 
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Internet users 
(per 100 
people) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1,377 4 ,241 13,50000 9,80742 -13,72977 40,72977 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
1,377 3,957 ,241 13,50000 9,80742 -13,84648 40,84648 
 
12.1.4  Cluster analysis 
This section shows a cluster analysis of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. The 
method takes into account the value of each variable, in order to ‘cluster’ the most 
similar countries together. The variables have been standardised (Z-scores) in 
order to work properly with this method (Hair et al. 2010:509-534). The cluster 
analysis method used here is a hierarchical cluster, and the result is shown in the 
dendrogram below:  
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